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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IRIS M. SPAFFORD, and
EARL S. SPAFFORD
*

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
GRANITE CREDIT UNION,

Case No. 20100086-CA

A Utah Corporation,
Defendant/Appellee.

APPELLANT'S EXHIBITS
APPEAL FROM A DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECUSE OR
OTHERWISE DISQUALIFY THE TRIAL COURT AND GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT
LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE TYRONE MEDLEY PRESIDING.

ANTHONY C. KAYE
MATHEW L. MONCUR
Ballard Spahr
201 S. Main Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

IRIS M. SPAFFORD
EARL S. SPAFFORD
6026 Village III Road
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Tele: (801) 278-5909
Attorneys Pro Se for
Plaintiffs/Appellants

Tabl

Earl S. Spafford, Plaintiff
In Propria Persona
6026 Village III Road
Murray, UT 84121
Telephone: (801) 699-8474
Telephone: (801) 278-5909

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IMS M. SPAFFORD, and
EARL S. SPAFFORD,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT

GRANITE CREDIT UNION,
A Utah Corporation.

Case No. 070911059

Defendant.

Judge Tyrone Medley

EARL S. SPAFFORD, having beenfirstduly SWORN on OATH deposes and says:
1. He is a party Plaintiff in this action, over the age of 18 and was an eye witness to the
tragic fall at the Granite Credit Union on April 4,2005. I have personal knowledge of all
facts and circumstances herein.
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2.

At the time of Ms' fall it was raining and traffic encircled the building to use the drive in
window on the opposite side. I had my eye squarely upon her as she got out of her car
and attempted to navigate the step leading from the parking lot To my knowledge no
one else saw her fall. Nonetheless, a crowd soon gathered and offered help. After the
ambulance arrived I saw the crowd disburse and I remember three individuals in separate
cars step downfromthe step where Iris fell to go to their separate parked cars.

3. I was sitting in my car listening to the radio and watching bis while Iris did
our banking. I was properly parked in a marked parking stall located at the South East
comer of building. The single handicapped parking was occupied. I walked with a cane,
and was thus permitted to park in a handicapped stall. It is shocking to me that there was
only one handicapped parking available to the patrons. We sometime bank at the main
office of the Credit Union, and it has adequate parking for the handicapped. Iris took the
shortest possible route to the Credit Union because the step was unmarked and traffic
around the perimeter was heavy. I made several observations that are apparent and
certainly within the knowledge and experience of the average lay man.
4. I say and have since seen that the Credit Union is very busy, with customers coming
aad going as the leave and return to their parked cars. I have taken the opportunity to
return often to the Credit Union to view the scene of her fall. The sidewalk on the East
side of the building is raised well above the parking lot and to a lesser degree to the West
The curb is tapered aggressively toward the North to allow the parking lot and sidewalk to
attempt to drain into a storm sewer. The storm drain was located only a few feet and in

2

Direct line from the step where she fell. Her head was in an accumulation of water from
the rain and inlet pipefromthe roof discharging into the parking lot.
The asphalt sloped awayfromthe step where she fell. It, like the step was in a state of
disrepair. The entire outside area obviously was badly maintained. The paint on the only
ramp accessible to the public and the ramp for employees at the top of which was a locked
door marked "Employees Only".
Both ramps were inadequately painted and the paint, such as it was, was deteriorated and
worn away. Even the ramps were in a state of disrepair. The entire exterior of the facility
including the entire step, both to the North and to the West was deteriorating with the edge
of the step broken and loose, showing an obvious lack of maintenance and design. Even
the concrete was displaced on the step.
The step was unmarked with a warning of any kind painted on the leading edge of the step.
Nor was it painted red or yellow, or at all, to warn patrons of the intrinsic dangerous
condition of the step. A handrail blocking egress or ingress was absent.
I observed traffic in the parking lot either going into the Credit Union or to the drive in
facility. Thus, Iris, like other customers whom I have observedfromtime to time took the
safest and most direct route to do our or their banking. To do otherwise, because it was
raining and dangerous, because of traffic, to traverse behind parked cars into a path of
moving vehicles in order to enter the building would be suicide. These observations were
open and obvious and certainly within the common experience of the average layman. I
have also looked at the appended pictures, which are incorporated by reference in this
Affidavit, and these have refreshed my recollection. These pictures were taken recently by
Mr. Clarence Kemp, a licensed civil engineer. Having seen these pictures I then went
to Granite Credit Union in order to verify what the pictures depict. I found that the
pictures accurately portray the step and parking lot when and where Iris fell.

9. On September 3,20091 took occasion to take a measuring tape and measure
the heights of the step where his fell and the step to the far West and far North. I found
the step to the North comer of the building to be 5 % inchesfromthe parking lot to the
sidewalk. Due to the deterioration of the leading edge of the step it was closer to 5 V4
inches. I found the step to the East corner of the building to be 5 lA inches high. The
step where Iris fell was 7 3A inches high, badly deterioratedfromlack of maintenance on
the leading edge. The asphalt was slopedfromthe step to the storm sewer in a dramatic
fashion. The waterfromthe Met pipe was sheeting where Ms'path took her. This
slope, also showing breaks in the surface from obvious lack of maintenance, together
with the broken and loose edge of the step caused Iris to fall.
10. Since Iris' fall I have developed a practice of observing other Credit Unions
And several banks, grocery stores, box stores, department stores, and even convenience
stores, and they all have adequate marked stalls for the handicapped and painted lines
where customers are alerted to a dangerous condition. The Credit Union had insufficient
(only one) such parking stalls and no painted steps whatsoever.
11. Iris was prior to the accident a vibrant, physically strong (despite her small frame). She
exercised regularly. She was in the swimming pool weekly while the pool was open. She
romped with her grandchildren. She taught classes in Church- She was even known to
drive a golf ball or bowl a few games. She never walked with a cane, nor needed one.
She had no history of fractures.
12.1 have lived and re-lived that April day and the days to follow. I have visited and re-
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visited the Credit Union many times to be sure of what I have seen. There is no doubt
that Granite Credit Union was negligent in it's maintenance of the obvious paths of
ingress and egress to the building by invited customers. It is evident to me that the steps
had not been maintained for many years, or as long as the Credit Union occupied the
building. Nor has the parking area around the storm drain be maintained or reconfigured. And I found no evidence that warning words, a guard rail, or any paint on
the step had been installed. It is obvious to me that speaking as a layman, drawing from
my common experience and knowledge personnel, agents or management of the Credit
Union either knew or should have known of the permanent, dangerous and negligence
condition leading to Ms' injuries.

£**~4*£^^<$
Earl S. SpafFord,InPersonrropria

STATE OF UTAH

}
} ss
}

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

On the \?> day of October, 2009 personally appeared before me, a NOTARY
PUBLIC, the signers of the above and foregoing Affidavit, and having
Been first duly SWORN on OATH declared that he signed said Affidavit, and the said
Affidavit was true.

"SS^Sm
Eaf*M0ctl.2«t}

I

NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in
Salt Lake County, Utah
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Earl S. Spafford
In Propria Persona
Attorney Pro Se
6026 Village HI Road
Murray, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 278-5909
Telephone: (801) 699-8474
Iris M. Spafford
In Propria Persona
Attorney Pro Se
6026 Village HI Road
Murray, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 278-5909

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY

TRIS M. SPAFFORD, and
EARL S. SPAFFORD
Plaintiffs,

}

DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESS

vs.
Case No. 070911059
GRANITE CREDIT UNION,
A Utah Corporation,

}

Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendants.

In conformance with Rule 26(a)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs,
Earl S. Spafford and Iris M. Spafford, In Propria Persona, hereby disclose that they have
employed Clarence Kemp, P.E., Senior Project Engineer, to offer expert testimony in this matter.
A copy of Mr. Kemp's report concerning the subject matter upon which he is expected to testify,

including but not limited to technical measurements of variable curb heights, sidewalk trip
hazards, lack of maintenance pedestrian hazards, ADA violations, drain inlets and other drainage
issues impacting pedestrian safety is appended hereto and incorporated herein. Additional
supporting photographic exhibits are also a part of Mr. Kemp's expert witness report.
In making this disclosure, which was previously made to the Corporate Defendant's
carrier, Plaintiffs reserve the right to work product and attorney client privilege, without waiving
the same, except as otherwise disclosed herein.
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2009.

<ZT
Earl S. Spafford, In Propria Persona
/&_

Iris M. Spafford, In Propria Persona

FORSGREN
§|

A S S O C I A T E S / INC.
MMUNlc

3 December 2000
Patricia L. LaTulippe, Attorney at Law
Nielsen & Senior. P.C.
5217 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Re:

Iris Spaftord v. Granite Credit Union
Civil-Site Inspection Report

Dear Ms. LaTulippe:
As requested, we have inspected the Granite Credit Union site located at 6799 South 900 East in Midvale. This
inspection focused primarily on civil-site construction and condition, particularly as it related to pedestrian safety. A
brief summary of our findings follows:
I. General
The site was first inspected by myself in January of 2006. I again inspected the site on Friday, December 1 st in
order to verify the details for this report. It appears that no significant changes or site maintenance (pavement
overlays, sidewalk replacement, trip hazard removal, etc) have occurred over the past year. The site is virtually
unchanged from the previous site visit. A site overview is attached hereto.
II. Specific Observations
a) Variable Curb Height on Building Perimeter Sidewalk: The sidewalk running along the south side of
the building edges the parking lot. There is no curb per se\ but rather the sidewalk is simply constructed
with an abrupt edge for pedestrians step up to from the parking area. The elevation "step" difference
between the sidewalk and the parking lot varies from 2-inches to 9-inches. It is normal practice per APWA
and most city standards to have a consistent curb height (normally 6-inches +/-). Given the pedestrian
access to this sidewalk throughout its length from the parking area, I believe this is somewhat akin to a
stairway with variable risers.
b) East Sidewalk Trip Hazard (Design / Construction related): The pedestrian sidewalk from 900 East
Street (approaching from the west) was constructed with a 3-inch high step as a tie-in to the straight
grades of the building perimeter sidewalk. This obvious trip hazard is not painted or otherwise marked to
warn pedestrians. From a design (and ADA) standpoint, this step should not have been eliminated in
favor of a minimal sidewalk slope to match grades at this location.
c)

Other Sidewalk Trip Hazards (Maintenance Related): Three sidewalk trip-hazards were noted as
shown on the attached sketch. These trip hazards are approximately %-inch high. We note that APWA
(Reference drawing 291 of APWA Manual of Standard Plans) defines sidewalks with a vertical or
horizontal displacement of Vi or more s defective, requiring replacement. These trip hazards appear to
be related to settlement and have not been addressed since my inspection of a year ago.

d) ADA Access Ramps: There are asphalt ramps from the parking area to the door entrances on the south
and east sides of the building. (We note that a sign on the west entrance indicates that it is for
employees only.) The south public access ramp has a slope of approximately 10%, slightly in excess of
the 1:12 (8.3%) standard ADA ramp slope contained in the "Department of Justice ADA standards for
Accessible Design (28 CFR Part 36). " Perhaps more of a concern is the lack of appropriate markings
identifying this ramp. While on-site, for example, I noted a older female customer with obvious a foot or
leg injury that elected to limp over the curb rather that utilize the ramp.

e) Drain Inlets and other Drainage issues Impacting Pedestrian Safety: The site was designed to
sheet drain across the parking lot pavement areas from the outside perimeter toward two drain inlets
located south and southeast of the building as shown on the attached sketch. The building roof drains
discharge directly into the parking lot where they also sheet flow into the inlets, raising concerns about
icing and related pedestrian safety. It was also noted that the pavement has settled around the south
drain inlet, thus raising the concrete inlet and grate about Mnnch or more above the surrounding
pavement, thus creating puddling, icing, and a potential trip hazard. The drain inlet box to the east has a
badly damaged concave grate, similarly creating concerns relative to pedestrian safety.

III. Summary Conclusions
This development appears to be "cookie-cutter" in nature with the building's perimeter sidewalk matching the
finish floor elevation of the building without regard to other site constraints. The surrounding parking lot and
sidewalk infrastructure appears to have been designed and constructed to primarily address surface drainage.
Pedestrian safety appears to have been almost an afterthought of the design/construction process.
The parking lot is laid out to encourage pedestrian access to the building from virtually any path or direction,
depending on where one is parked. This is problematic from the standpoint of pedestrian safety due to the items
discussed above including variable curb heights, sidewalk trip hazards, adverse grades on drainage inlets, etc.
As you know, we have not seen the original site-design drawings for the project. If such drawings still exist, I
would suspect that they were likely lacking in specific curb and parking lot grade elevations and details, leaving
this responsibility to the contractor. These construction-related problems have been further aggravated by the
lack of site maintenance.
I hope that this information is helpful as you determine how to best proceed with this litigation. Please feel free to call
if you wish to discuss this report or if we can be of further service.

Sincerely,

Forsgren Associates, Inc.

Clarence Kemp, P.E.
Sr. Project Engineer

Granite Credit Union
Site Overview
(6799 South 900 East, Midvale, Utah)

Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(A. Building Perimeter Sidewalk)
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Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(A. Building Perimeter Sidewalk)

Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(B. Sidewalk Trip Hazard)

Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(C. Other Sidewalk trip hazards)
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Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(C. Other Sidewalk trip hazards)

Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(D. Pedestrian Ramp—South)
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Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(D. Pedestrian Ramp—South)
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Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(D. Pedestrian Ramp—East)

Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(E. Storm Drain Boxes and Roof Drains)

Granite Credit Union Site Photo Log
(E. Storm Drain Boxes and Roof Drains)
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SCIENCES

Matthew Moncur
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP
One Utah Center, Suite 600
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2221

June 10,2009

RE. Iris and Earl Spafford v. Granite Credit Union
MRANo.: A789
Preliminary Inspection Report
Background'
According to the complaint, on or about April 4 2005, Ms. Spafford exited the passenger side
of the car her husband had parked in the eastern most stall on the south side of the subject
Granite Credit Union. She walked northward to the sidewalk in front of the stall. As she
attempted to step up the east curb to the sidewalk, she lost her balance and fell backward
Reportedly she was injured The complaint indicated that the property's dangerous and
defective condition caused the accident. MRA Forensic Sciences was asked to inspect the
property located at 6799 South 900 East Midvale, Utah, and form an opinion about matter.

Figure 1: View of east curb where Ms. Spafford lost her balance and fell. The silver vehicle
is parked approximately where the Spafford car had been parked.
Information Reviewed:
•
•

MRA Forensic Sciences 02/15/08 inspection of the Granite Credit Umon parking lot,
curb and sidewalk.
Complaint for case number 070911059.

125 W. Burton, Salt Lake City, UT 84115 (801 )-746-1145 ph. (801)-746-1170 fax.

•
•

Granite Credit Union inspection report written by Clarence Kemp, PE, of Forsgren
Associates, Inc.
Conversation with a Midvaie, Utah building department official.

W

Granite Credit Union

.East Entrance

N

Spafford's Car %
Sidewalk
South Entrance
Grate
Approximate chosen path
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Figure 2: Credit Union site map.
Findings:

•

The asphalt pavement, curb and sidewalk features encountered by Ms. Spafford as
she made her way to the credit union building were not in violation of building code
requirements. The features were neither dangerous nor defective. The top of the curb
and sidewalk was substantially level.

Discussion:
Reportedly the subject property was built around 1988. This investigator believes that the
property features relevant to this case had not been significantly altered between the time of
the accident and the MRA inspection.
Paragraph 11 of the complaint stated that Ms. Spafford "had" to step up the east facing curb
because there was not enough room for her to step up the south curb. However, there would
have been enough room if Mr. Spafford had parked further away from the curb. Even
parking as he did Ms. Spafford did not have to attempt to ascend the east curb. She could
have taken an alternate route. For example, she could have walked around the back of the
car to reach the curb ramp outside the south entrance. Or, she could have continued walking
along the east curb to the ramp outside the east entrance (Figures 2 and 3). Alternately, she
could have been dropped off outside the building's south entrance before the car was parked.
The alternatives were not used. Ms. Spafford1 s chose to attempt to step up the east curb.

Paragraph 12 stated, "the curb is unmarked and is dangerous in that it is uneven". It stated,
"the curb quickly begins to slant downward towards the building so that when one is trying to
step up onto the curb the left foot must step up higher than the right foot by several inches".
It stated, "there is no handrail to block the area from pedestrians or to assist a pedestrian widi
his/her balance in stepping up on the uneven walkway. Nor is there a warning to advise the
patron to be carefiil when stepping up". In fact, measurements with a digital level showed
that the top of the curb and the sidewalk beyond were on average within a fraction of one
degree of being level. The complaint statement that the left foot must step up higher than the
right foot by several inches greatly mischaracterized the condition of the substantially level
curb and sidewalk; a level surface has the same elevation all over. A person stepping up the
curb would have to raise the second foot to the level of the first. The statement that the curb
quickly slants toward the building is inaccurate; the sidewalk is nearly perfectly level. This
is not defective or dangerous; this is the normal and expected condition of a curb and
sidewalk.

Figure 3: Shows ramp outside east entrance.

Figure 4: The ramp outside the south entrance.

Paragraph 13 of the complaint stated that there was a drain in the parking lot located a few
feet southeast of the sidewalk area and the asphalt around the drain sloped toward the drain to
allow water to flow to the drain. It stated that die sloped pavement was a problem because it
required a customer to exert extra effort to walk up to the curb. Measurements found that the
drain's nearest point was 7-foot 4-inches east of the east curb edge and 1-foot 7-inches south
of the south curb edge. The pavement did sloped toward the drain, as it must for water to
flow to the drain. It is true that walking up slope takes more effort than walking across level
ground. It is not clear that this is a problem. Many persons were seen walking toward and
stepping up the curb during the MRA inspection. None showed any observed sign of
hesitation or difficulty. Each simply approached the curb, stepped up, and moved on.
The Forsgren Associates property inspection report found variable elevation difference
between the parking lot pavement and the sidewalk. The elevation ranged from 2 to 9 inches.
MRA measurements confirmed this finding, however, the elevation change was gradual as
one moved along die curb/sidewalk edge. This was particularly true of the curb in the area of
the accident. The southeast curb/sidewalk corner measured about 8-3/4-inches tall.
Measured 6-inches north of the corner, the east curb face was about 8-inches tall. 6-inches
further along, the curb was still 8-inches tall. 4-feet north of the corner the curb height was
7-1/2 inches, varying only l/2-inch in 3-feet. The Forsgren report said that it is normal
practice per APWA and most city standards to have a consistent curb height (normally 6inches +/-). This does not mean the height is required by code; it is not. A Midvale, Utah
building department representative stated that they did not have a curb height requirement
other than what was needed to meet ADA standards. The representative observed that in
1988, when the property was developed, ADA requirements did not exist. It should be noted
that an 8-inch curb is not remarkably tall Stair step riser heights of 7-3/4 inches are
commonly found. It is more critical that the top of the curb be level, which it was.
Paragraph 14 of the complaint stated, "Ms. Spafford attempted to step up onto the eastside
curb of the sidewalk with her right foot. As she went to lift her left foot, she did not get her
foot up completely onto the higher part of the curb. Ms. Spafford lost her balance and fell
backward towards the drain hitting her head on the asphalt of the parking lot." This
statement indicated that Ms. Spafford was unable to raise her left foot to the height of her
right foot which she had successfully placed on top of the level curb. Her backward fall
indicated that she had no forward momentum; otherwise she would have fallen forward.
Together these things suggested that Ms. Spafford labored to step up onto the curb, and was
physically unable to complete the step.
Conclusion:
It is the opinion of this investigator that Ms. Spafford chose to attempt to step up the east
curb onto the sidewalk, although alternate routes with ramps were available to her. She did
not have to ascend the curb as she did. Even so, the pavement, curb and sidewalk features
she encountered immediately prior to her accident were not defective or dangerous. The
curb/sidewalk was substantially normal. It was level, about the same height as an ordinary
step, and many persons were observed stepping up the curb without difficulty. This

suggested that the accident was caused by something other than the condition of the Granite
Credit Union pavement, curb and sidewalk.
The opinions expressed in this report are based on the review information. They may need to
be reconsidered if new information becomes available.
Best regards,

Larry Smiltneek, MS, PSE
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Earl S. Spafford
In Propria Persona
Attorney Pro Se
6026 Village HI Road
Murray, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 278-5909
Cellular: (801) 699-8474
Iris M. Spafford
In Propria Persona
Attorney Pro Se
6026 Village m Road
Murray, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 278-5909

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

miS M. SPAFFORD, and
EARL S. SPAFFORD
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED
DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESS

vs.
GRANITE CREDIT UNION,
A Utah Corporation,
Defendants.

Case No. 070911059
Judge Tyrone Medley

COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFFS, Earl S. Spafford and Iris M. Spafford, In Propria
Persona, pursuant to Utah R Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B), and as further allowed under the exemption
requirement of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(aX2)(A)(vi), to hereby disclose that it has employed Clarence
S. Kemp, P.E. to offer expert testimony in this matter. A copy of a report containing the subject
matter upon which Mr. Kemp is expected to testify and the grounds for his opinion is attached

hereto and marked Exhibit A. In addition, a copy of Mr. Kemp's qualifications, including
publications, and rate of compensation for his expert testimony is marked Exhibit B, and
appended hereto.

DATED this 23rd day of September, 2009

4
Earl S. SpafFord, In Propria Persona

Iris M. SpafFord, In Propria Persona

EXHIBIT B

COMPENSATION
For purposes of preparing his report, reaching his expert witness conclusion,
investigation, and testimony in deposition or at trial, in the present case, Mr. Kemp
is compensated at the rate of $200. per hour.
For hands on construction design or supervision of Streets or Sidewalk
Projects, Municipal Engineering, Storm Drainage Conveyance/Hydrology, or for
the drafting of Municipal Safe Sidewalk and/or Safe building Ordinances or
Municipal Safety Standards, his fees may vary, based upon a bid award system,
made on behalf of Forsgren Associates.

QuickTime Piayer.lnk

FOItSGREN
ASSOCIATES / IMC.
^MMUNK
3 December 2006
Patricia L. LaTulippe, Attorney at Law
Nielsen & Senior. P.C.
5217 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Re:

Iris Spafford v. Granite Credit Union
Civil-Site Inspection Report

Dear Ms. LaTulippe:
As requested, we have inspected the Granite Credit Union site located at 6799 South 900 East in Midvaie. This
inspection focused primarily on civil-site construction and condition, particularly as it related to pedestrian safety. A
brief summary of our findings follows:
I. Genor.il
The site was first inspected by myself in January of 2006. I again inspected the site on Friday, December 1 st in
order to verify the details for this report. It appears that no significant changes or site maintenance (pavement
overlays, sidewalk replacement, trip hazard removal, etc) have occurred over the past year. The site is virtually
unchanged from the previous site visit. A site overview is attached hereto.
II. Specific Observations
a) Variable Curb Height on Building Perimeter Sidewalk: The sidewalk running along the south side of
the building edges the parking lot. There is no curb per se\ but rather the sidewalk is simply constructed
with an abrupt edge for pedestrians step up to from the parking area. The elevation "step" difference
between the sidewalk and the parking lot varies from 2-inches to 9-inches. It is normal practice per APWA
and most city standards to have a consistent curb height (normally 6-inches +/-). Given the pedestrian
access to this sidewalk throughout its length from the parking area, I believe this is somewhat akin to a
stairway with variable risers.
b) East Sidewalk Trip Hazard (Design / Construction related): The pedestrian sidewalk from 900 East
Street (approaching from the west) was constructed with a 3-inch high step as a tie-in to the straight
grades of the building perimeter sidewalk. This obvious trip hazard is not painted or otherwise marked to
warn pedestrians. From a design (and ADA) standpoint, this step should not have been eliminated in
favor of a minimal sidewalk slope to match grades at this location.
c)

Other Sidewalk Trip Hazards (Maintenance Related): Three sidewalk trip-hazards were noted as
shown on the attached sketch. These trip hazards are approximately %-inch high. We note that APWA
(Reference drawing 291 of APWA Manual of Standard Plans) defines sidewalks with a vertical or
horizontal displacement of Vi or more s defective, requiring replacement. These trip hazards appear to
be related to settlement and have not been addressed since my inspection of a year ago.

d) ADA Access Ramps: There are asphalt ramps from the parking area to the door entrances on the south
and east sides of the building. (We note that a sign on the west entrance indicates that it is for
employees only.) The south public access ramp has a slope of approximately 10%, slightly in excess of
the 1:12 (8.3%) standard ADA ramp slope contained in the "Department of Justice ADA standards for
Accessible* Design (28 CFR Part 36). " Perhaps more of a concern is the lack of appropriate markings
identifying this ramp. While on-site, for example, I noted a older female customer with obvious a foot or
leg injury that elected to limp over the curb rather that utilize the ramp.

e) Drain Inlets and other Drainage Issues Impacting Pedestrian Safety: The site was designed to
sheet drain across the parking lot pavement areas from the outside perimeter toward two drain inlets
located south and southeast of the building as shown on the attached sketch. The building roof drains
discharge directly into the parking lot where they also sheet flow into the inlets, raising concerns about
icing and related pedestrian safety. It was also noted that the pavement has settled around the south
drain inlet, thus raising the concrete inlet and grate about Vi-inch or more above the surrounding
pavement, thus creating puddling, icing, and a potential trip hazard. The drain inlet box to the east has a
badly damaged concave grate, similarly creating concerns relative to pedestrian safety.

111. Summary Conclusions
This development appears to be "cookie-cutter" in nature with the building's perimeter sidewalk matching the
finish floor elevation of the building without regard to other site constraints. The surrounding parking lot and
sidewalk infrastructure appears to have been designed and constructed to primarily address surface drainage.
Pedestrian safety appears to have been almost an afterthought of the design/construction process.
The parking lot is laid out to encourage pedestrian access to the building from virtually any path or direction,
depending on where one is parked. This is problematic from the standpoint of pedestrian safety due to the items
discussed above including variable curb heights, sidewalk trip hazards, adverse grades on drainage inlets, etc.
As you know, we have not seen the original site-design drawings for the project. If such drawings still exist, I
would suspect that they were likely lacking in specific curb and parking lot grade elevations and details, leaving
this responsibility to the contractor. These construction-related problems have been further aggravated by the
lack of site maintenance.
I hope that this information is helpful as you determine how to best proceed with this litigation. Please feel free to call
if you wish to discuss this report or if we can be of further service.

Sincerely,

Forsgren Associates, Inc.

Clarence Kemp, P.E.
Sr. Project Engineer

Granite Credit Union
Site Overview
(6799 South 900 East, Midvale, Utah)
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EXHIBIT A

CLARENCE S. KEMP, P.E.

EDUCATION
B.S.C.E., Brigham Young University, 1982
(Magna Cum Laude)

Professional Engineer, Colorado #37492
Professional Engineer, Wyoming #5480
Professional Engineer, Utah #4984482
Professional Engineer, Idaho #10676
Professional Engineer, Nevada #18617

American Water Works Association
Consulting Engineers Council
American Public Works Association

1983-Present

FORSGREN ASSOCIATES, INC.
Project Manager / Division Manager

2001 - Present
1981 « 1983
1980-1981

City Engineer - City of Holladay, UT
CHICAGO BRIDGE AND IRON COMPANY
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Kemp has nearly 30 years of "hands-on" experience in the planning, <Jesign, and construction of
public infrastructure projects. This experience includes his streets and roads, pavements, storm
drainage, water supply and distribution, wastewater collection, etc. In addition to his role as a
design engineer and project manager, Mr. Kemp also functions in the role of City Engineer for five
cities and multiple special districts in Utah and Wyoming.
SPECIFY
Historic Restoration, Pedestrian, and Trails Projects
Mr. Kemp also has extensiye experience with site development and public beautification
projects. Most of this experience has involved municipal sponsorship or ownership. In many
cases, historic preservation was a primary concern. A few projects which Mr. Kemp was
directly responsible include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Historic Union Center Master Plan - Evanston, Wyoming
Historic South Main Street Beautification - f?odc Springs, Wyoming
Historic Rail Road Avenue Utilities and Beautification - Green River, Wyoming
Centennial Subdivision Renovation - Evanston, Wyoming
White Mountain Village Improvements - Rock Springs, Wyoming
Sioux Drive Restoration - Evanston, Wyoming

CLARENCE S. KEMP, P,E,
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*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Forest Dale Golf Course - Salt Lake City, Utah
AML Presidents Streets Utilities and Restoration - Rock Springs, Wyoming
550 East Mill Creek Wetlands and Flood Control - Salt Lake County, Utah
Bear River State Park - Wyoming State Parks and Historic Sites
Town of Star Valley Ranch - Vista Drive entry way and trails,
City of HoJIadayHistoric Downtown "Village"Project, Holiaday Utah
Holiaday Boulevard Trails System Master Planning
LaBarge, Wyoming Trails Project planning and design
CokevUie, Wyoming Trials Environmental Clearances

Streets and Sidewalks Projects
Mr. Kemp also has extensive experience with street maintenance, construction, and safe
sidewaJks projects, A few projects which Mr. Kemp was directly responsible include:
•

•
•

•

City of HoJIaday, UT Pavement Inventory and Management Plan; This project
Included 93 miles of pavement inspection and documentation. Mr. Kemp authored a G\S inventory tool to
allow for efficient data collection and analysis. Based on this work,tineCity authorized a $9 million bond
for pavement work in 2009-2010. Mr. Kemp is the project manager for that work.
City Of MarbJeton Streets. Mr. Kemp was responsible for the evaluation of 8 miles of failing sfreets
in this small community. The resulting$ 6 million streets and drainage project was completed in late 2008.
City Of Holiaday, U T Safe Sidewalks Program: In his role as City Engineer, Mr. Kemp was
responsible for the inventory and evaluation of Holladay's sidewalks. The resulting study was the
template for the city's safe sidewalk program focusing on schools and high pedestrian traffic areas. This
project identified serious safety deficiencies and tripping hazards throughout the city. Mr. Kemp has
been project manager on many sidewalk projects throughout the city resulting from this plan. One of the
immediate outcomes of fois study was ^n annualized program of trip hazard removal throughout the city.

Taylorsville, City, UT Pavement Management Plan: Using the GIS template developed for
Holiaday, Mr. Kemp is working with the City of Taylorsville to develop a comprehensive pavement
management plan.

•

Rock Springs, WY Presidents Streets Reconstruction: Mr. Kemp was project manager

•

for $5 million in streets reconstruction work in the Presidents Streets residential area. These projects
were necessitated by mine subsidence problems. The project was awarded national recognition form the
U.S. Department of Interior.
Safe Sidewalks - 2300 E a s t (Lincoln tO 4500 South) - Mr. Kemp was the design engineer
and project manager for this sidewalk project along the east side of 2300 East in Holiaday. The project is
specifically intended to address pedestrian safety concerns associated with Olympus High School on this
busy traffic corridor.

•

•

•

Safe Sidewalks -

Highland Drive (Cottonwood mall south to Oakwood

Elementary School) - Mr. Kemp was the design engineer and project manager for this sidewalk
project along the east side of Highland Drive in Holiaday. The project is specifically intended to address
pedestrian safety concerns associated with Oakwood .Elementary SchooJ located on this busy traffic
corridor
Safe Sidewalks - CrestView Elementary School - In his role as city engineer, Mr. Kemp
was the city's project manager responsible for the UDOT funded section of sidewalk on 2000 East across
from Crestview Elementary School. As part of the funding process, Mr. Kemp worked dosely with foe
<5ranite School District to identify needs and help develop their "safe routes to school" program."

Safe Sidewalks - Cottonwood Elementary School - in his role as city engineer, Mr. Kemp
was foe city's project manager responsible for foe UDOT fonded section of sidewalk on Holiaday Blvd
across from Cottonwood €lementary School. As part of foe fording process, Mr. Kemp worked closely
with the Granite School District to identify needs and help develop their "safe routes to school" program."

•

Safe SidewaJks - Murray-Holladay Road {Holiaday Blvd, to Wander Lane) - Mr.
Kemp was the design engineer and project manager for this sidewalk project along the North Side of
Murray Holiaday Road.. The project is specifically intended to address pedestrian safety concerns
associated with an existing church and school children using this route.
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•

Safe Sidewalks - Murray-Holladay Road (Kings Row) - Mr. Kemp was the design
engineer and project manager for this sidewalk project along the South Side of Murray Holladay Road
past the "Frisbee Park"., The project will address significant pedestrian safety concerns associated with
the regional park along this busy road.

Municipal Engineering
Mr. Kemp's engineering background focuses heavily on municipal engineering. He
understands the importance of public coordination, public safety, budgeting, funding, rate
structure impacts, etc. He has been designated as the city engineer for many communities
including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

City of Holladay, Utah
Town of Cokeville, Wyoming
Town of Marbleton, Wyoming
Town of LaBarge, Wyoming
Town of Big Piney, Wyoming
Town of Bear River, Wyoming
Etna Water and Sewer District
Freedom, Wyoming Water and Sewer District
Bedford, Wyoming Water & Sewer District
Town of Star Valley Ranch, Wyoming

In this role, Mr. Kemp is responsible for capital projects planning and design, pavement
management, safe sidewalk programs, buiJding department administration, etc. He has also
authored design standards for many communities. He is also responsible for developmental reviews
and staff approvals.
Storm Drainage Conveyance I Hydrology
Mr. Kemp has completed storm drain master plans for the cities of Malad, Idaho, and Sandy,
Utah. He is experienced with accepted computer modeling such as SWMM, HEC-1, HEC-2,
and STORM. In addition, he has authored software for detention basin flow routing and
hydrologic calculations using the SCC or Denver unit hydrograph methods.
His experience includes the detailed design and construction of numerous rigid pipe and open
channel conveyance facilities for the State of Wyoming, Utah DOT, Salt Lake County, Salt
Lake City, and many other clients. These designs have required the optimization of pipe
sizing, detention basins, pipeline materials analysis, and other oost saving measures. Specific
projects for which Mr. Kemp was directly responsible include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Bear River Basin Planning Study - Wyoming Water Development Commission
Evanston Storm Drainage Masterplan - Evanston, Wyoming
Gateway Storm Drain - Salt Lake City, Utah
Flat Iron Basin Master Plan - Salt Lake City, Utah
1300 East Master Plan - Salt Lake City, Utah
Southwest Canal Study - Salt Lake City, Utah
Mill Creek Channel improvements - Salt Lake City, Utah
550 East Detention Basin - Salt Lake City, Utah
City Creek Channel Restoration - Salt Lake County, Utah
Forest Dale GoJf Course/Detention Basins - Salt Lake County and City, Utah
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1-215 Storm Drainage Calculations - Utah DOT
1 st Avenue Area Storm Drain System - Evanston, Wyoming
Morse Lee Area Storm Drain System - Evanston, Wyoming
Bear River Channel Stabilization - Evanston, Wyoming
Wayman Basin Storm Drain System, HoHaday, Utah
HoHaday Storm Drain Master Plan, HoHaday, Utah

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

CityofHolladay Safe Sidewalk Management System. -2003
Town of Marbleton, WY Pavement Management Plan - 2006
City of HoHaday, UT Developmental Design Standards -2004
City of Bluffdale, UT Developmental Design Standards - 2003
City of HoHaday, UT Building Department Standards - 2007
City of Kemmerer, WY Building Department Standards - 2007
Town of LaBarge, WY Building Department Standards and Ordinance - 2008
City of HoHaday, UT sidewalk ordinance - 2006
City of HoHaday, Street Cut Ordinances and Standards - 2008

CASES IN
JANUARY l i ' W

MR,

TIFlEi

-NONE-
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EXHIBIT B

COMPENSATION
For purposes of preparing his report, reaching his expert witness conclusion,
investigation, and testimony in deposition or at trial, in the present case, Mr. Kemp
is compensated at the rate of $200. per hour.
For hands on construction design or supervision of Streets or Sidewalk
Projects, Municipal Engineering, Storm Drainage Conveyance/Hydrology, or for
the drafting of Municipal Safe Sidewalk and/or Safe building Ordinances or
Municipal Safety Standards, his fees may vary, based upon a bid award system,
made on behalf of Forsgren Associates.

QuickTime Player.lnk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand delivered to Counsel as
follows: Anthony C. Kaye and Matthew L. Moncur, 201 South State Street, Suite 800, Salt Lake
City, UT 84111, on this 23* day of September, 2009.

4L
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Earl S. Spafford, In Propria Persona
6026 Village III Road
Murray, UT 84121
Tele: (801) 278-5909
Cell: (801) 699-8474
Iris M. Spafford, In Propria Persona
6026 Village III Road
Murray, UT 84121
Tele: (801) 278-5909
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IRIS M. SPAFFORD, and
EARL S. SPAFFORD,

}

Plaintiffs,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF CLARENCE KEMP, B.C.S.E.,
P.E., and SENIOR PROJECT ENGINEER
}

GRANITE CREDIT UNION,
Defendant.

Case No. 070911059

}

Honorable Tyrone Medley

STATE OF UTAH

}
}ss
COUNTYOFSALT LAKE }
1. I am over the age of 18 years of age and have personal knowledge of the matters
stated herein.
2. I have worked as a Licensed Professional Engineer since 1988, and am currently
employed at Forsgren Associates as a Senior Project Engineer. I have extensive
"hands on" experience in the planning, design, and construction of public
infrastructure systems. This experience includes sidewalks and the development of
safe sidewalk programs, streets and roads, pavements, walkways, storm drainage,
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water supply and distribution, etc. In addition to my role as a design engineer and
project manager, I also function in the role of City Engineer for five cities and towns
and multiple special districts in Utah and Wyoming.
3. I have been employed to testify in the above entitled matter on behalf of Earl S.
Spafford and Iris M. Spafford. A true and correct copy of my curriculum vitae is
attached hereto as Exhibit ' A ' . I a m uniquely qualified to testify in this matter.
4. I was retained by to determine if the premises involves some unsafe condition of a
permanent nature upon the subject premises, which I inspected, known as 6799 S. 900
E., Midvale, UT.
5. I specifically looked for violations of ADA Statutory Violations, Code, and other
building and design standards which are both accepted and required within the
Building Industry. I was also asked to determine any lack of civil-site maintenance of
the subject property, and sought to determine whether any of these conditions were
dangerous and defective and whether such conditions may have played a role in the
serious injuries sustained in a fall by his M. Spafford.
6. The site was first inspected by myself shortly after the accident, and again on
December 1,2006. It appears that no significant changes (pavement overlays,
sidewalk and asphalt maintenance, sidewalk replacement, trip hazard removal, etc)
had occurred during this time. The site remained virtually unchanged from the
previous site visit. A copy of the site overview is attached to my Expert Report, as an
attachment to Exhitit 4 B \
7. For the purpose of this affidavit, special emphasis will be placed upon the South East
side of the building, where the injury occurred, despite the existence of ADA, Code,
trip hazards, variable curb heights on the building perimeter sidewalk, and other
multiple construction, design, and maintenance violations replete throughout the
subject premises.
I have interviewed Earl S. Spafford and his M. Spafford, am advised that on or about
April 5,2005, because all other stalls were taken, the Spaffords parked their vehicle
on the last parking stall to the East, thereby allowing adequate room for Mrs.
Spafford, to maneuver around the car in order to step upon the curb.
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8. The sidewalk at this location is characterized by a variable curb height and is situated
very close to a storm drain inlet with steep asphalt grades. This trip hazard was not
(and is not) painted or otherwise marked to warn pedestrians.
9. The pedestrian sidewalk from 900 East Street (approaching from the west) was
constructed with a 3-inch high step as a tie-in to the straight grades of the building
perimeter sidewalk. This obvious trip hazard is not painted or otherwise marked to
warn pedestrians. From a design standpoint, this step should have been eliminated in
favor of a minimal sidewalk slope to match grades at this location.
10. Three additional sidewalk trip hazards were also noted at the time of my initial
inspection, as approximately %" high. The APWA {Reference Drawing 291 ofAPWA
Manual of Standard Plans) defines sidewalks with a vertical or horizontal
displacement of lA" or more as defective, requiring replacement. These trip hazards
are likely related to settlement, and had not been addressed or corrected at the time of
my follow-up inspection approximately one year later.

Granite Credit Union is, in

my opinion, responsible for this hazardous condition by failing to maintain safe
premises, and to properly safeguard against settling, and to properly maintain the
ingress and egress to the building in a safe and prudent manner. Moreover, Granite
Credit Union failed to eliminate or mitigate dangerous and defective conditions on the
property, contributing to or causing Mrs. Spafford's serious injuries.
11. The site was designed to sheet drain across the parking lot pavement areas from the
outside perimeter toward two drain inlets located south and southeast of the building
as shown on the attached sketch. The building roof drains discharge directly into the
parking lot where they also sheet flow into the inlets, raising concerns about icing,
slick wet surfaces, and related pedestrian safety. It was also noted that the pavement
has settled around the south drain inlet, thus raising the concrete inlet and grate V2inch or more above the surrounding pavement, thus creating puddling, icing, and
another potential pedestrian trip hazard for customers parked on the east side of the
parking lot. The drain inlet box to the east has a badly damaged concave grate,
similarly creating concerns relative to pedestrian safety. Again, it was noted in the
follow-up inspection approximately on year later that Granite Credit Union failed to
eliminate or mitigate these dangerous and defective conditions.
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12. That the only access ramp to which the public as allowed to use, as entry to the lobby
of the building is on the South side of the building. The south public access ramp has
a slope of approximately 10%, slightly in excess of the 1:12 (8.3%) standard ADA
ramp slope contained in the Department of Justice ADA Standards for Accessible
Design (28 CFR part 36). This too constitutes a dangerous and defective condition.
13. That additional Code, design and maintenance violations occurred, as high as %
inches high in violation of APWA {Reference drawing 291 ofAPWA Manual of
Standard Plans) which defines sidewalks with a vertical or horizontal displacement
of 1/2 " or more as defective, thereby requiring replacement. Granite Credit Union's
failure to maintain its walkways, including that on the Southeast section of the
building, constitutes a dangerous and defective condition.
14. All of these defects, in my opinion, constitute a dangerous and defective condition.
But for the condition of the defects complained or, arising out of both a defective
design, and a failure by the landowner to properly maintain the premises, Mrs.
Spafford would not otherwise have been injured.
15. In conclusion, the civil-site development appears to be "cookie cutter" in nature with
the building's perimeter sidewalk matching the finish floor elevation of the building,
without regard to other site restraints. The surrounding parking lot and sidewalk
infrastructure appears to have been designed and constructed to primarily address
surface drainage. Pedestrian safety appears to have been almost an afterthought of the
design/construction process.
16. The parking lot is laid out to encourage pedestrian access to the building from
virtually any path or direction, depending upon where one is parked. This is
problematic from the standpoint of pedestrian safety due to the items discussed above
including variable curb heights, sidewalk trip hazards, adverse grades on drainage
outlets, etc. These construction related problems have been further aggravated by the
lack of site maintenance.
17. It is my expert opinion that the subject premises, and specifically the site of Mrs.
Spafford's fall, constitutes a permanent dangerous and defective condition, for which
Granite Credit Union is responsible.
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18. Further affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this %^_ day of October, 2009.

Clarence Kemp, P.E
Sr. Project Engineer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 ^ day of October, 2009

i

)

My Commission Expires:^ \y\ : CtfAf-

j^cggm.Exp, 0 9 / f 7 ^{ Q

Page 5 of 5

f^us^hiui^
^Notary Public

CLARENCE S. KEMP, P.E.

B.S.C.E., Brigham Young University, 1982
(Magna Cum Laude)

Professional Engineer, Colorado #37492
Professional Engineer, Wyoming #5480
Professional Engineer, Utah #4984482
Professional Engineer, Idaho #10676
Professional Engineer, Nevada #18617

American Water Works Association
Consulting Engineers Council
American Public Works Association

1983-Present

FORSGREN ASSOCIATES, INC.
Project Manager / Division Manager

2001 - Present
1981-1983
1980-1981

City Engineer - City of Holladay, UT
CHICAGO BRIDGE AND IRON COMPANY
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Kemp hasneariy 30 years of "hands-on" experience in the planning, design, and construction of
public infrastructure projects. This experience includes his streets and roads, pavements, storm
drainage, water supply and distribution, wastewater collection, etc. In addition to his role as a
design engineer and project manager, Mr. Kemp also functions in the role of City Engineer for five
cities and multiple special districts in Utah and Wyoming.

Historic Restoration, Pedestrian, and Trails Projects
ML Kemp also has extensive experience with site development and public beautification
projects. Most of this experience has involved municipal sponsorship or ownership. In many
cases, historic preservation was a primary concern. A few projects which Mr. Kemp was
directly responsible include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Historic Union Center Master Plan - Evanston, Wyoming
Historic South Main Street Beautification - Rock Springs, Wyoming
Historic Rail Road Avenue Utilities and Beautification - Green River, Wyoming
Centennial Subdivision Renovation - Evanston, Wyoming
White Mountain Village improvements - Rock Springs, Wyoming
Sioux Drive Restoration - Evanston, Wyoming

CLARENCES. KEMP, P.E.
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Forest Dale Golf Course - Salt Lake City, Utah
AML Presidents Streets Utilities and Restoration - Rock Springs, Wyoming
550 East Mill Creek Wetlands and Flood Control - Salt Lake County, Utah
Bear River State Park - Wyoming State Parks and Historic Sites
Town of Star Valley Ranch - Vista Drive entry way and trails,
City of Holladay Historic Downtown "Village"Project, Holladay, Utah
Holladay Boulevard Trails System Master Planning
LaBarge, Wyoming Trails Project planning and design
Cokeville, Wyoming Trials Environmental Clearances
Streets and Sidewalks Projects
Mr. Kemp also has extensive experience with street maintenance, construction, and safe
sidewalks projects. A few projects which Mr. Kemp was directly responsible include:
•

•
•

•

City of Holladay, UT Pavement Inventory and Management Plan:

This project

Included 93 miles of pavement inspection and documentation. Mr. Kemp authored a G1S inventory tool to
allow for efficient data collection and analysis. Based on this work, the City authorized a $9 million bond
for pavement work in 2009-2010. Mr. Kemp is the project manager for that work.
City Of Marbleton Streets. Mr. Kemp was responsible for the evaluation of 8 miles of failing streets
in this small community. The resulting$ 8 million streets and drainage project was completed in late 2008.
City Of Holladay, UT Safe Sidewalks Program: In his role as City Engineer, Mr. Kemp was
responsible for the inventory and evaluation of Holladay's sidewalks. The resulting study was the
template for the city's safe sidewalk program focusing on schools and high pedestrian traffic areas. This
project identified serious safety deficiencies and tripping hazards throughout the city. Mr. Kemp has
been project manager on many sidewalk projects throughout the city resulting from this plan. One of the
immediate outcomes of this study was an annualized program of trip hazard removal throughout the city.

Taylorsville, City, UT Pavement Management Plan: Using the GIS template developed for
Holladay, Mr. Kemp is working with the City of Taylorsville to develop a comprehensive pavement
management plan.

•

Rock Springs, WY Presidents Streets Reconstruction: Mr. Kemp was project manager

•

for $5 million in streets reconstruction work in the Presidents Streets residential area. These projects
were necessitated by mine subsidence problems. The project was awarded national recognition form the
U.S. Department of Interior.
Safe Sidewalks - 2300 East (Lincoln tO 4500 South) - Mr. Kemp was the design engineer
and project manager for this sidewalk project along the east side of 2300 East in Holladay. The project is
specifically intended to address pedestrian safety concerns associated with Olympus High School on this
busy traffic corridor.

•

•

•

Safe Sidewalks -

Highland Drive (Cottonwood mall south to Oakwood

Elementary School) - Mr. Kemp was the design engineer and project manager for this sidewalk
project along the east side of Highland Drive in Holladay. The project is specifically intended to address
pedestrian safety concerns associated with Oakwood Elementary School located on this busy traffic
corridor
Safe Sidewalks - CreStview Elementary School - In his role as city engineer, Mr. Kemp
was the city's project manager responsible for the UDOT funded section of sidewalk on 2000 East across
from Crestview Elementary School. As part of the funding process, Mr. Kemp worked closely with the
Granite School District to identify needs and help develop their "safe routes to school" program."

Safe Sidewalks - Cottonwood Elementary School - in his role as city engineer, Mr. Kemp
was the city's project manager responsible for the UDOT funded section of sidewalk on Holladay Blvd
across from Cottonwood Elementary School. As part of the funding process, Mr. Kemp worked closely
with the Granite School District to identify needs and help develop their "safe routes to school" program."

•

Safe Sidewalks - Murray-Holladay Road (Holladay Blvd. to Wander Lane) - Mr.
Kemp was the design engineer and project manager for this sidewalk project along the North Side of
Murray Holladay Road.. The project is specifically intended to address pedestrian safety concerns
associated with an existing church and school children using this route.
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•

Safe Sidewalks - Murray-Holladay Road (Kings Row) - Mr Kemp was the design
engineer and project manager for this sidewalk project along the South Side of Murray Holladay Road
past the Trisbee Park".. The project will address significant pedestrian safety concerns associated wilh
the regional park along this busy road.

Municipal Engineering
Mr. Kemp's engineering background focuses heavily on municipal engineering. He
understands the importance of public coordination, public safety, budgeting, funding, rate
structure impacts, etc. He has been designated as the city engineer for many communities
including:
City of Holladay, Utah
Town of Cokeville, Wyoming
Town of Marbleton, Wyoming
Town of LaBarge, Wyoming
Town of Big Piney, Wyoming
Town of Bear River, Wyoming
Etna Water and Sewer District
Freedom, Wyoming Water and Sewer District
Bedford, Wyoming Water & Sewer District
Town of Star Valley Ranch, Wyoming
In this role, Mr. Kemp is responsible for capital projects planning and design, pavement
management, safe sidewalk programs, building department administration, etc. He has also
authored design standards for many communities. He is also responsible for developmental reviews
and staff approvals.
Storm Drainage Conveyance I Hydrology
Mr. Kemp has completed storm drain master plans for the cities of Malad, Idaho, and Sandy,
Utah. He is experienced with accepted computer modeling such as SWMM, HEC-1, HEC-2,
and STORM. In addition, he has authored software for detention basin flow routing and
hydrologic calculations using the SCC or Denver unit hydrograph methods.
His experience includes the detailed design and construction of numerous rigid pipe and open
channel conveyance facilities for the State of Wyoming, Utah DOT, Salt Lake Gounty, Salt
Lake City, and many other clients. These designs have required the optimization of pipe
sizing, detention basins, pipeline materials analysis, and other cost saving measures. Specific
projects for which Mr. Kemp was directly responsible include:
Bear River Basin Planning Study - Wyoming Water Development Commission
Evanston Storm Drainage Masterplan - Evanston, Wyoming
Gateway Storm Drain - Salt Lake City, Utah
Flat Iron Basin Master Plan - Salt Lake City, Utah
1300 East Master Plan - Salt Lake City, Utah
Southwest Canal Study - Salt Lake City, Utah
Mill Creek Channel Improvements - Salt Lake City, Utah
550 East Detention Basin - Salt Lake City, Utah
City Creek Channel Restoration - Salt Lake County, Utah
Forest Dale Golf Course/Detention Basins - Salt Lake County and City, Utah
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1-215 Storm Drainage Calculations - Utah DOT
1st Avenue Area Storm Drain System - Evanston, Wyoming
Morse Lee Area Storm Drain System - Evanston, Wyoming
Bear River Channel Stabilization - Evanston, Wyoming
Wayman Basin Storm Drain System, Holladay, Utah
Holladay Storm Drain Master Plan, Holladay, Utah

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

City of Holladay Safe Sidewalk Management System. - 2003
Town of Marbleton, WY Pavement Management Plan - 2006
City of Holladay, UT Developmental Design Standards -2004
City of Bluffdale, UT Developmental Design Standards - 2003
City of Holladay, UT Building Department Standards - 2007
City of Kemmerer, WY Building Department Standards - 2007
Town of LaBarge, WY Building Department Standards and Ordinance - 2008
City of Holladay, UT sidewalk ordinance - 2006
City of Holladay, Street Cut Ordinances and Standards - 2008

-NONE-

FORSGREN

cAteiciAiu Txc.
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BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

One Utah Center, Suite 800
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2221
Telephone: (801)531-3000
Facsimile: (801)531-3001
Attorneys for Defendant Granite Credit Union

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IRIS M. SPAFFORD AND EARL S.
SPAFFORD,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY SMILTNEEK,
MS, PSE
Case No. 070911059

GRANITE CREDIT UNION,

Honorable Tyrone Medley

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

1.

I am over the age of eighteen and have personal knowledge of the matters stated

2.

I am presently employed as an engineer for MRA Forensic Sciences ("MRA")

herein.

and have been retained as an expert witness in this matter by Defendant Granite Credit Union
("GCU"). A true and correct copy of my curriculum vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

3.

I was retained as an expert by GCU to provide expert testimony with respect to

the design and condition of the GCU property located at 6799 S. 900 E., Midvale, Utah (the
"Property") and to provide my expert opinion as to whether the design and condition of the
Property were dangerous and defective and whether such conditions played any role in the
alleged fall of Iris M. Spafford ("Ms. Spafford") on or about April 4,2005.
4.

On February 15, 2008,1 personally inspected the Property. In addition, I have

reviewed the Complaint in this matter and various other documents.
5.

As an expert in engineering and accident investigation I have reached conclusions

with respect to the condition of the Property and the cause of Ms. Spafford's alleged fall. A true
and correct copy of the expert report that I prepared in this matter is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
6.

While paragraph 11 of the Complaint alleges that Ms. Spafford "had" to step up

the east facing curb because there was not enough room for her to step up the south curb. Ms.
Spafford would have had adequate room to step up on the south side of the building if Mr.
Spafford had parked further away from the curb.
7.

Even with Mr. Spafford having parked close to the south curb, Ms. Spafford had

numerous alternate routes available and did not have to attempt to ascend the east curb. For
example, she could have walked around the back of the car to reach the wheelchair accessible
ramp outside the south entrance, less than twenty feet from the Spaffords' car. Or, Ms. Spafford
could have continued walking along the east curb to the ramp outside the east entrance.
Alternately, Mrs. Spafford could have been dropped off outside the building's south entrance

before the car was parked. These alternatives were not used, and instead Ms. Spafford chose to
attempt to step up the east curb.
8.

Plaintiffs7 allegation in Paragraph 12 of the Complaint that "the curb is unmarked

and is dangerous in that it is uneven" is simply untrue. In fact, measurements with a digital level
showed that the top of the curb and the sidewalk beyond were on average within a fraction of one
degree of being level.
9.

Plaintiffs' allegation in paragraph 12 of the Complaint that "when one is trying to

step up onto the curb the left foot must step up higher than the right foot by several inches"
greatly mischaracterizes the condition of the substantially level curb and sidewalk; a level
surface has the same elevation all over. A person stepping up the curb would simply have to
raise the second foot to the level of the first.
10.

Plaintiffs' allegation in paragraph 12 of the Complaint that "the curb quickly

begins to slant downward towards the building" is also inaccurate; the sidewalk is nearly
perfectly level. This is not defective or dangerous; this is the normal and expected condition of a
curb and sidewalk.
11.

The allegation made in paragraph 13 of the Complaint that "in addition a drain is

located a few feet southeast of the sidewalk area in the parking lot and the asphalt around the
drain slants downward toward the drain to allow the water to flow into the drain" and that this
sloped pavement requires additional effort to walk up does not indicate the existence of any
dangerous or defective condition at the Property.

12.

My measurements determined that the drain's nearest point was seven feet four

inches east of the east curb edge and one foot seven inches south of the south curb edge. The
pavement does slope toward the drain, as it must for water to flow to the drain, and this does not
represent a dangerous or defective condition.
13.

I observed many persons walking toward and stepping up the curb at the location

of Ms. Spafford's alleged fall during my inspection of the property. None showed any sign of
hesitation or difficulty. Each simply approached the curb, stepped up, and moved on.
14.

While there are variable elevation differences between the parking lot pavement

and the sidewalk at the property, ranging between two and nine inches, such changes are gradual
as one moves along the curb/sidewalk edge, particularly in the area of Ms. Spafford's alleged
fall.
15.

The southeast curb/sidewalk comer measured about eight and three-quarters

inches tall. Measured six inches north of the comer, the east curb face was about eight inches
tall. Six inches further along, the curb was still eight inches tall. Four feet north of the comer
the curb height was seven and one-half inches, varying only one-half inch in three feet.
16.

An eight inch curb is not remarkably tall. Stair step riser heights of seven and

three-quarters inches are commonly found. Thus, the height of the curb that Plaintiffs' contend
caused Ms. Spafford's fall was about the same height as an ordinary step.
17.

Even more importantly, the fact that the top of the curb in the area of Ms.

Spafford's alleged fall is substantially level indicates that the curb in that area is neither
dangerous nor defective.

18.

Plaintiff alleges in paragraph 14 of the Complaint that "Ms. Spafford attempted to

step up onto the eastside curb of the sidewalk with her right foot. As she went to lift her left
foot, she did not get her foot up completely onto the higher part of the curb. Ms. Spafford lost
her balance and fell backward towards the drain hitting her head on the asphalt of the parking
lot." This statement indicates that Ms. Spafford was unable to raise her left foot to the height of
her right foot which she had successfully placed on top of the level curb.
19.

Mrs. Spafford's backward fall indicated that she had no forward momentum;

otherwise she would have fallen forward. Together, these things show that Ms. Spafford labored
to step up onto the curb, and was physically unable to complete the step, suggesting that her fall
was caused by something in her own physical condition, and not by the condition of the
pavement, curb, and sidewalk at the Property.
20.

The asphalt pavement, curb and sidewalk features encountered by Ms. Spafford as

she made her way to the credit union building were not in violation of building code
requirements, nor were they dangerous or defective.
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DATED this H

day of August 2009.

A.tWu3^LARRY 9MILTNEEK, MS, PSE
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

My Commission Expires:

lb\i-zJ2dn

)°\ day of August 2009.

NOTARY PUBLIC
mf\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct of copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
LARRY SMILTNEEK, MS, PSE was served to the following this
2009, in the manner set forth below:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No.
Iris M. Spafford
6026 Village III Road
Murray, UT 84121
Earl S. Spafford
6026 Village III Road
Murray, UT 84121

return receipt requested

of August,

CURRICULUM VITAE
Larry Smiltneek, M.S., P.E.
3/9/2009
SPECIALTIES:
Mechanical and Electrical Forensic Investigations. Failure Analysis and Accident Investigation. Structural
Analysis and Design. Mechanical System Design and Prototype Fabrication. Instrumentation and Testing.
EDUCATION:
MSME 6/2003 University of Utah; Majored in Machinery Design, Special Interest: Stress Analysis and
Fracture Mechanics.
BSME 6/1994 University of Utah.
MEMBERSHIPS:
SAE,ASME
LICENSURE - ACCREDIDATION:
State of LTtah Professional Structural Engineer #265646-2203.
ACTAR - traffic accident reconstruction - Reg# 2032.
EMPLOYMENT:
7/94 - Present: Engineer MRA Forensic Sciences. Investigate residential and light commercial construction
and component related issues including those involving soils, foundations, floors, walls, roofs, HVAC
systems and plumbing. Inspect and develop repair plans for damaged buildings. Investigate failures of
residential and commercial appliances, including those diat result in fire. Investigate failures of a wide
range of machines and mechanisms including pumps, heaters, automatic gates, doors and locking systems.
Investigate vehicle crashes including and those that involve single and multiple cars and motorcycle*.
Cases range from low speed rear end collisions of light vehicles to those that involve heavy commercial
vehicles at high speeds. Analyze lock/ignition systems of stolen recovered vehicles. Have designed and
built custom instrumentation systems and test apparatus, including systems for testing structures and
machines. Examples include apparatus for sensing steering angle, measuring brake pressures, and
measuring vibration levels.
9/2003 - Present: Owner LS Engineering, Inc., Design and build special machinery including material
handling "under hook" attachments, wheelchair deck lift and entertainment type rides. Developed sit-stand
modifications for electric wheelchair. Produce prototype parts to customer specifications.
1/02 - 6/04: Research Assistant University of Utah Mechanical Engineering Department. Performed
research on fatigue strength of aircraft aluminum materials. Designed, built, and operated a hydraulically
actuated metal fatigue test machine for use within a scanning electron microscope.
9/94 - 9/97: Partner K-Tronics, Inc., Involved in design, test, and manufacturing of solid-state controllers
for electromagnetic brake retarder. Also developed line of associated hand control and brake pedal control
devices. Sold partnership position for royalties.
9/92 - 7/94: Research Assistant University of Utah Mechanical Engineering Department. Participated in
research of vehicle dynamics and control. Member of team that designed and built an advanced brake
research vehicle.
6/75 - 9/88: Employee Techwood Inc. (now Uniplex, Inc.), Wisconsin based machinery design and
manufacturing company. Duties included machinist, design consultant, project manager, customer
relations.

PUBLICATIONSJOURNAL PUBLICATIONS:
1. Smiltneek, L., "2D Photogrammetry for Accident Scene Documentation" Utah State Trooper. Volume 7,
No. 1, Spring 2000
2. Smiltneek, L, "Single Cylinder Approach for In-situ Study of Fatigue Cracks", Master's Thesis, University
of Utah, May 2003
3. Smiltneek, L, Shinde, S.R., Hoeppner, D.W., "Single cylinder in situ Scanning Electron Microscope
Fatigue System", Review of Scientific Instruments. 77, 015104, 2006
PATENTS:
1. Kimbrough, S., Henderson, R., and Smiltneek, L., "Electromagnetic Retarder Control Apparatus and
Method", Patent Number 5,743,599, Issued 4/28/98
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SCIENCES
FEE SCHEDULE and POLICIES
As of December 1,2008
Non-testifying activities

Larry Smiltneek, M.S., P.E.

$170.00 per hour

Depositions & other testimonies

$220.00 per hour

The non-testifying rate is tor the following services: case work up, testing, reconstruction, analysis, meetings and
travel time.

Case Set-up Fee: Applies to cases that are sent without materials necessary to accomplish
assignment. $480.00. NON-REFUNDABLE six months after date received. If work begins
prior to the six month date, the fee will be applied to work accomplished.
Retainer: NON-REFUNDABLE. We do not consider ourselves retained until the payment
is received. Retainers are required upon request.
Automobile Fees: Mileage will be charged for any travel in reference to the case at .70
cents per mile.
Printing and Production Fees: Printing of case file materials.
Color Prints - $1.00/page
B & W Prints & Copies - $0.10/page
CD-$10
VHS-$15
DVD-$20
Administration Fees are $35/hr. Applicable on projects requiring 30 minutes or more.
Travel Fees (if applicable): Airfare, Hotel, Meals & Mileage, etc. Please note NONREFUNDABLE Airfare will be charged to the client if travel is canceled.
Deposition Fees: 2 Hours minimum of deposition time PRE-PAID is required. Additional
time and/or expenses will be invoiced.
Cancellation Policy:
[scheduling/reserving a date for TRIAL, HEARING, ARBITRATION,
MEDIATION or DEPOSITION Testimony]

Cancellations less than 6 Working Days before scheduled testimony date
$500.00 plus incurred hours & expenses.
A service charge of llA% per month is charged on the unpaid balance of all accounts that
are 30 days or older. Statements are sent on a mondily basis.
We would like to avoid any unnecessary costs, as would you, so if there are any clianges in the status of the
TRIAL, HEARING, ARBITRATION, MEDIATION or DEPOSITION, please notify us as soon as possible. If
you have any questions, regarding this letter, please call.

TAX ID #: 87-0431453, for corporate name: Motion Research Associates, Inc.

125 W. Burton, Salt Lake City, UT 84115 (801 )-746-1145 ph. (801)-746-1170 fax.
800-747-6820 toll free

Cases Larry Smiltneek has testified in either a deposition or a trial
since January 1,1996
5/16/07
CASE
NAME

2680
3183
3772
B289

DEPO
DATE

Clarence Vincent v. Construction Rental & Supply
10/10/96
Gilda Cecilia Lythgoe v. Katherine & Edward McAvc 6/4/98
Ranae Neely v. Steve Bennett
11/2/99
Miguel Perez, et al. v. Tommy R. Perdue
Property Casualty Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Gray I 5/1/2009
Norman Stevens v. American Hood Systems, Inc.
4/27/2009

TRIAL
DATE

3/1/00

VENUE

4th District Court of Utah County, State of Utah
3rd District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
District Court, Clark County, State of Nevada
District Court, Jefferson County, Colorado
2nd Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah
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COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFFS, Earl S. Spafford and Iris M. Spafford, In Propria
Persona, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56, to submit the following Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. A careful review of

2

this memorandum and its supporting exhibits will clearly demonstrate that there are disputed
issues of material fact and judgment cannot be entered as a matter of law.
INTRODUCTION
At the outset, plaintiffs urge the court to:
a), recognize that plaintiff is entitled to all competing inferences in their favor in
determining whether there is a material issue of fact which then precludes
summary judgment;
b). recognize that, in fall eases, there are two alternative theory of recovery under
Utah Law. Before the Court is the theory that the conduct of the defendant, in
allowing a permanent defective and dangerous condition to exist, in and of itself,
creates a foreseeable risk of harm. For such cases, actual or constructive notice is
not an element of proof;
c). recognize that when testimony is within the common knowledge of laypersons,
expert testimony is not required;
d). recognize that the court may take judicial notice of statutes or regulations
defining what is defective;
e). recognize that defendant's expert, Larry Smiltneek, lacks the proper
credentials to testify as a civil or structural engineer, as he is a mechanical
engineer, and his experience and training are limited to equipment failure, and
equipment related issues only. Accordingly, any testimony given by Mr.
Smiltneek is based upon false assumptions for which he lacks the skill and
training to testify, and constitutes inadmissible hearsay. At the very least, it
should go to the weight of his testimony if the court allows it into evidence; and
f). recognize that the Court has eonsiderable discretion to determine whether a
particular expert is qualified and whether particular testimony would be helpful
and suitable in a particular case.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
It is well settled under Utah Law, that "Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences in
determining whether there is a material issue of fact which precludes summary judgment." Silcox
v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814P.2d623, 625 (Utah App. 1991).
And there is a second standard of review exercised by Utah Courts in negligence cases:
We note that summary judgment should be granted with great caution
where negligence is alleged. Apache Tank Lines v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615
(Utah 1995); This is because "[ijssues of negligence ordinarily present questions
of fact to be resolved by the fact finder." Id "It is only when the facts are
undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that
such issues become questions of law." Id Accordingly, summary judgment is
reserved for only the most clear-cut negligence cases. Ingram v. Salt Lake City,
733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); as cited in English v. Kienke, 114
P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App. 1989).
Plaintiffs submit that upon a reading of the competing testimony and the reasonable
inferences that arise therefrom, when construed in plaintiffs' favor, particularly in this negligence
action, defendants motion should be denied in its entirety.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1. Defendants statement of undisputed material facts is agreed to by the plaintiffs,
however, plaintiffs would like to add the following
2. On or about April 5, 2005, plaintiff Iris Spafford ("Mrs Spafford)" was severely
injured in a fall that occurred on the subject premises known as Granite Credit Union,
6799 S. 900 E., Mdvale, Utah.
3. Defendant had control of the premises including the parking lot adjacent to the credit
union. Plaintiffs' Complaint, para. 6; Deposition of Curtis Doman, p. 6, lines 16-20
(Exhibit4 5*).
4. Earl and Iris Spafford pulled into the South side of the credit union parking lot and
parked in the last parking stall farthest to the east corner of the building, as it was the
only remaining stall closest to the building.
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5. Mrs. Spafford got out of the passenger side of the car and walked to reach the corner
of the credit union's most southerly mode of ingress and egress. Affidavit ofEarl
Spafford, para. 3.
6. It is undisputed that plaintiffs have alleged the existence of 'construction and design
defects' in the parking lot at the Property and that GCU^negligently and carelessly
permitted the parking lot and on the curb to become and remain in a defective and
dangerous condition. Defendant's Memorandum, para. 4, citing Plaintiff's complaint,
para 14-21.
7. It is undisputed that Curtis Lynn Doman, CEO for Granite, conducted periodic
inspections of the property, at least twice per year, to address repair and maintenance
of the subject property. Doman Deposition, p. 13, lines 11-25; p. 14 lines 1-23;
Exhibit 5,
MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE
Pursuant to IL R Civ Proc 7{e) <3)(B), and in the interest of clarity, to the
extent plaintiffs dispute an issue of fact, plaintiffs will provide a verbatim
restatement of each t)f the moving party's facts that are controverted, and will
follow the numbered paragraphs as they correspond to the defendant's moving
papers:
8. "No modifications or changes have been made to the parking area or the
sidewalk/curb area of the Property since the date of Ms. Spafford^ s alleged falF
Plaintiffs' Response:
Granite Credit Union made modifications to the asphalt during its ownership of
the property. As stated by Curtis Lynn Doman, CEO: "A. I don't know and - don't
know what we've done to find additional repairs. I'm not aware of any repairs except
asphalt replacement kinds of'things" Doman Deposition, p. 33, line 25; p. 34, lines 1,
2. (Exhibit'5').
11. "Mr. Smiltneek also analyzed various documents, including the Complaint in this
case, and, as an expert in engineering and accident investigation has concluded that GCU

did not breach any duty owed to Mrs Spafford, that the Property is not in defective or
dangerous condition, and that the pavement, curb, sidewalk of the property did not cause
Mrs Spafford's alleged injuries"
Plaintiffs' Response:
There is a material dispute of fact, between the parties, as they are in
disagreement as to the precise variable heights of the curb when measured from the
asphalt to the top of the curb According to the lay testimony of Earl S Spafford "On
September 3, 2009, Hook occasion to take a measuring tape and measure the heights of
the step where Iris fell and the step to the far west and far north I found the step to the
east corner of the building to be five and one quarter inches from the parking lot to the
sidewalk I found the step to the east corner of the building to be five and three quarter
inches from the parking lot to the sidewalk The step where Iris fell was seven and three
quarter inches high, badly deteriorated from lack of maintenance on the leading edge " Id.
para 9 (Exhibit '4')
Clarence Kemp testified in his affidavit that "The east sidewalk constituted a trip
hazard, as it was constructed with a 3 inch high steep as a tie in to the straight grades
of the building perimeter sidewalk This obvious trip hazard was not, nor is now, painted
or otherwise marked to warn pedestrians From a design and ADA standpoint, this step
should have been eliminated in favor of a minimal sidewalk slope to match grades at this
location ^ Kemp Affidavit, para 9, (Exhibit c3^)
Mr Kemp concludes by stating Three additional sidewalk trip hazards were also
noted, as approximately 3A inches high The APWA (Reference Drawing 291 ofAPWA
Manual of Standard Plans) defines sidewalks with a vertical or horizontal displacement
of V2 inch or more as defective and Granite Credit Union is responsible for this hazardous
condition by failing to maintain safe premises, and to properly safeguard against settling,
and to properly maintain the ingress and egress to the building in a safe and prudent
manner Moreover, Granite Credit Union failed to eliminate or mitigate dangerous
and defective conditions on the property, contributing to or causing Mrs. Spafford's
injuries." Kemp Affidavit, para 10 (emphasis added)
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Plaintiffs submit that the Court should take judicial notice of the violation of the
APWA (Reference Drawing 291 ofAPWA Manual of Standard Plans) in finding a
defective condition. Accord, Brigham City v. Valencia, 779 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah App.
1989) (The trial court acted properly in taking judicial notice of a Brigham City Building
Ordinance).
12. "While paragraph 11 of the Complaint alleges that Mrs. SpafFord "had" to step up the
east facing curb because there was not enough room for her to step up on the south curb,
Mrs. SpafFord would have had adequate room to step up on the south side of the building
if Mr. SpafFord had parked further away from the Gurb".
Plaintiffs' Response:
"I was sitting in my car listening to the radio and watching Iris while Iris did our
banking. I was properly parked in a marked parking stall located at the South East corner
of the building, and Iris took the shortest route to the Credit Union, as it was otherwise
unmarked and traffic around the perimeter was heavy." Earl SpafFord, Affidavit, para. 2.
13. "Even with Mrs. SpafFord having parked close to the south curb, Mrs. SpafFord had
numerous alternate routes and did not have to attempt to ascend the east curb. For
example, she could have walked around the back of the car to reach the wheelchair
accessible ramp outside the south entrance, less than twenty feet from the SpafFord's car.
Or, Mrs. SpafFord could have continued walking along the east curb to the ramp outside
the east entrance. Alternately, Mrs. SpafFord could have been dropped ofF outside the
building's south entrance before the car was parked. These alternatives were not used,
and instead Mrs. SpafFord's chose to attempt to step up the east curb".
Plaintiffs Response:
This issue of material fact was placed in dispute by expert witness Clarence
Kernp^ who summarized: "The parking lot is laid out to encourage pedestrian access to
the buildingfromvirtually any path or direction, depending upon where one is parked.
This is problematicfromthe standpoint of pedestrian safety due to the items
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discussed above including variable curb heights, sidewalk trip hazards, adverse grades on
drainage outlets, etc. These construction related problems have been further aggravated
by the lack of site maintenance", Kemp Affidavit, para. 16.
And as stated above by Earl SpafFord: "I was sitting in my car listening to the
radio and watching Iris while Iris did our banking. I was properly parked in a marked
parking stall located at the South East corner of the building, and Iris took the shortest
route to the Credit Union, as it was otherwise unmarked and traffic around the perimeter
was heavy." Earl SpafFord, Affidavit, para. 2.
14. "Plaintiffs' allegation in paragraph 12 of the Complaint that "the curb is
unmarked and is dangerous in that it is uneven" is simply untrue. In fact, measurements
with a digital level showed that the top of the curb and sidewalk beyond were on average
within afractionof one degree of being level",
15. "Plaintiffs' allegation in paragraph 12 of the Complaint that "when one is
trying to step up onto the curb the left foot must step up higher than the right foot by
several inches" greatly mischaracterizes the condition of the substantially level curb and
sidewalk; a level surface has the same elevation all over. A person stepping up the curb
would simply have to raise the second foot to the level of the first".
16. Plaintiffs allegation in paragraph 12 of the Complaint that "the curb quickly
begins to slant downward towards the building" is also inaccurate; the sidewalk is nearly
perfectly level This is not defective or dangerous; this is the normal and expected
condition of a curb and sidewalk".
Plaintiffs Response to paragraphs 14,15 and 16:
"On September 3, 2009, I took occasion to take a measuring tape and measure the
heights of the step where Iris fell and the step to the far West and far North. I found the
step to the North corner of the building would be 5 % inchesfromthe parking lot to the
sidewalk. I found the step to the east corner of the building to be 5 Vi inches high. The
step where Iris fell was 7 3A inches high, badly deteriorated from lack of maintenance on
the leading edge. The asphalt was sloped from the step to the storm sewer in a dramatic
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fashion. The waterfromthe inlet was sheeting Iris' path of ingress and egress. This slope,
also showing breaks in the surface from the obvious lack of maintenance, together with
the broken and loose edge of the step caused Iris to fall". Spafford Affidavit, Para. 10.
As further stated by Clarence Kemp: aThe sidewalk at this location is
characterized by a variable curb height and is situated very close to a storm drain inlet
with steep asphalt grades. This trip hazard was not (and is not) painted or otherwise
marked to warn pedestrians"Kemp Affidavit, para. 8.
The curb is unmarked and uneven, including both the sidewalk and the asphalt
parking lot adjoining the concrete. Both parties are in agreement that there are variable
heights on the North and East asphalt and Curb, but dispute measurements taken by each
party. See Affidavit ofLarry Smiltneek, para. 12, 14, and 15; Affidavit ofEarl Spafford,
para. 4, 5^ (Exhibit '4') and (Kemp Expert's Report; Exhibit \2') and Affidavit of
Clarence Kemp, para. 9, 10, and 16, (Exhibit c3'). "It is my opinion that the subject
premises, and specifically the site of Mrs. Spafford's fall, constitutes a permanent
dangerous and defective condition, for which Granite Credit Union is responsible." Kemp
Affidavit, para. 17.
17. "The allegation made in paragraph 13 of the Complaint that "[i]n addition a
drain is located a few feet southeast of the sidewalk area in the parking lot and the asphalt
around the drain slants downward toward the drain to allow the water to flow into the
drain" and that this sloped pavement requires additional effort to walk up does not
indicate the existence of any dangerous or defective condition to the property."
18. Mr. Smiltneek's measurements determined that the drain's nearest point was
seven feet four inches east of the east curb edge and one foot seven inches south of the
south curb edge. The pavement does slope toward the drain, as it must for water to flow
to the drain, and this does not represent a dangerous or defective condition"
19. "Mr. Smiltneek observed many person's walking toward and stepping up the
curb at the location of Ms. Spafford's alleged fall during his inspection of the property.
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None showed any sign of hesitation or difficulty. Each simply approached the
curb, stepped up, and moved on "
Plaintiffs' Response to paragraphs 17,18 and 19:
The parties are in agreement that a drain is located a few feet southeast of the
building and the fact that asphalt around the drain slants downward to allow the water
to flow into the drain is also undisputed. Smiltneek Affidavit, para. 11, Affidavit of
EarlSpqfford, para. 9, (Exhibit '4')..
What is in dispute is whether the drain and the water inlets that feed it, while
discharging directly into the Spafford's parking space, suffer from lack of
maintenance and constitute a defective and dangerous condition. In the words of
Clarence Kemp: 'That additional design and maintenance violations occurred,
including the drain inlet box to the East, which has a badly damaged concave grate,
creating two drain inlets, that drain south and southeast of the building as shown on
the attached sketch appended to Exhibit c 2\ The building roof discharges directly into
the parking lot where they also sheet flow into the inlets, raising concerns about icing
and related pedestrian safety. It was also noted that the pavement that had settled
around the south drain inlet, arising out of lack of Granite's maintenance, thus
creating puddling, icing and a potential trip hazard. This also constitutes a dangerous
and defective condition."
A careful reading of the affidavit of Larry Smiltneek does not once address the
issue of lack of maintenance, but instead conditions his entire affidavit on "design and
construction", and whether the conditions complained of constitute a dangerous and
defective condition. Accordingly, plaintiffs' allegations rising to the level of improper
maintenance are undisputed, and the issues surrounding defective design and
construction are clearly in dispute.
It is undisputed that the drain and inlets were in the proximity of the ingress of
Mrs. Spafford. Smiltneek Affidavit, para. 11. In the words of Earl Spafford: "The
asphalt was sloped from the step to the storm drain in a dramatic fashion. The water
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from the inlet was sheeting Iris' path of ingress and egress. This slope also shows
breaks in the surface from obvious lack of maintenance, together with the broken and
loose edge of the step, caused Iris to fall." Spafford Affidavit, para. 9.
These construction related problems have been further aggravated by the lack of
site maintenance. It is my expert opinion that the subject premises, and specifically
the site of Mrs. SpafFord's fall, constitutes a permanent dangerous and defective
condition, for which Granite Credit Union is responsible.^Xe/wp Affidavit, para. 16,
In the words of Earl Spafford: "I have lived and re-lived that April day and the
days to follow. I have visited and revisited the Credit Union many times to be sure of
what I have seen. There is no doubt that Granite Credit Union was negligent in its
lack of maintenance of the obvious paths of ingress and egress to the building by
invited customers. It is evident to me that the steps had not been maintained for many
years, or as long as the Credit Union occupied the building. Nor has the parking area
around the storm drain be maintained or reconfigured. And I found no evidence that
warning words, a guard rail, or any paint on the step had been installed. It is obvious
to me, speaking as a layman, drawing from my common experience and knowledge,
that personnel, agents, or management of the credit union either knew or should have
known of the permanent, dangerous and negligent condition which I believe led to
Iris' injuries." Spafford Affidavit, para. 12.
In the words of Clarence Kemp, Senior Project Engineer: "The site was designed
to sheet drain across the parking lot pavement areasfromthe outside perimeter
toward two drain inlets located south and southeast of the building as shown on the
attached sketch. The building roof drains discharge directly into the parking lot where
they also sheetflowinto the inlets, raising concerns about icing, slick wet surfaces,
and related pedestrian safety. It was also noted that the pavement has settled around
the south drain inlet, thus raising the concrete inlet and grate Vi inch or more above
the surrounding pavement, thus creating puddling, icing, and another potential
pedestrian trip hazard for customers parked on the east side of the parking lot. The
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drain box to the east has a badly damaged concave grate, similarly creating concerns
about pedestrian safety. Again, it was noted in the follow-up inspection
approximately one year later that Granite Credit Union failed to eliminate or mitigate
these dangerous and defective conditions". Kemp Affidavit, para. 11.
20. "While the variable elevation differences between the parking lot pavement
and the sidewalk at the property, ranging between two and nine inches, such changes
are gradual as one moves along the curb/sidewalk at the property, particularly in the
area of Mrs. Spafford's alleged fall".
21. "The southeast curb/sidewalk corner measures about eight and three-quarters
inches tall. Measured six inches to the north, the east curb is about eight inches tall.
Six inches further along, the curb was still eight inches tall. Four feet north of the
corner the curb height was seven and one-half inches, varying only one-half inch in
three feet".
22. "An eight inch curb is not remarkably tall. Stair step riser heights of seven and
three-quarters inches are commonly found. Thus, the height of the curb that Plaintiffs'
contend caused Mrs. Spafford5s fall was about the same height as an ordinary step".
23. "Even more importantly, the fact that the top of the curb in the area of Mrs.
Spafford's alleged falls is substantially level indicates that the curb in the area is
neither dangerous nor defective".
24. "Plaintiffs^ allege in paragraph 14 of the Complaint that "Mrs. Spafford
attempted to step up onto the eastside curb of the sidewalk with her right foot. As she
went to lift her left foot, she did not get her foot up completely onto the higher part of
the curb. Ms. Spafford lost her balance and fell backward towards the drain hitting
her head on the asphalt of the parking lot". This statement indicates that Ms. Spafford
was unable to raise her left foot to the height of her right foot which she had
successfully placed on top of the level curb. Mrs. Spafford's backward fall indicates
that she had no forward momentum; otherwise she would have fallen forward.
Together, these things show that Ms. Spafford labored to step up onto the curb, and
was physically unable to complete the step, indicating that her fall was caused by
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something in her own physical condition, and not by the condition of the pavement,
curb and sidewalk at the Property".
Plaintiffs' Response to paragraphs 20, 21,22, 23 and 24:
As stated by Earl Spafford: "Iris was prior to the accident a vibrant, physically
strong woman (despite her small frame). She exercised regularly. She was in the
swimming pool weekly while the pool was open. She romped with her grandchildren.
She taught classes in church. She was even known to drive a golf ball or bowl a few
games. She never walked with a cane, nor needed one. She had no history of fractures".
Spafford Affidavit, para. 11.
"I have lived and re-lived that April day and the days to follow. I have visited and
revisited the Credit Union many times to be sure of what I have seen. There is no doubt
that Granite Credit Union was negligent in its lack of maintenance of the obvious paths of
ingress and egress to the building by invited customers. It is evident to me that the steps
had not been maintained for many years, or as long as the Credit Union occupied the
building. Nor has the parking area around the storm drain be maintained or reconfigured.
And I found no evidence that warning words, a guard rail, or any paint on the step had
been installed. It is obvious to me, speaking as a layman, drawing from my common
experience and knowledge, that personnel, agents, or management of the credit union
either knew or should have known of the permanent, dangerous and negligent condition
which I believe led to Iris' injuries.7' Spafford Affidavit, para. 12.
"On September 3, 2009,1 took occasion to take a measuring tape and measure the
heights of the step where Iris fell and the step to the far West and far North. I found the
step to the North corner of the building would be 5 % inches from the parking lot to the
sidewalk. I found the step to the east corner of the building to be 5 Vi inches high. The
step where Iris fell was 7 % inches high, badly deteriorated from lack of maintenance on
the leading edge. The asphalt was sloped from the step to the storm sewer in a dramatic
fashion. The water from the inlet was sheeting Iris' path of ingress and egress. This slope,

also showing breaks in the surface from the obvious lack of maintenance, together with
the broken and loose edge of the step caused Iris to falf\ Spafford Affidavit, Para. 10.
As further stated by Clarence Kemp: "The sidewalk at this location is
characterized by a variable curb height and is situated very close to a storm drain inlet
with steep asphalt grades. This trip hazard was not (and is not) painted or otherwise
marked to warn pedestrians." Kemp Affidavit, para. 8.
TJhe curb is unmarked and uneven, including both the sidewalk and the asphalt
parking lot adjoining the concrete. Both parties are in agreement that there are variable
heights on the North and East asphalt and Curb, but dispute measurements taken by each
party. See Affidavit of Larry Smiltneek, para. 12, 14, and \5\ Affidavit of Earl Spafford,
para. 4, 5, (Exhibit '4') and {Kemp Expert's Report; Exhibit '2') and Affidavit of
Clarence Kemp, para. 9, 10, and 16, (Exhibit £ 3'). "It is my opinion that the subject
premises, and specifically the site of Mrs. Spafford's fall, constitutes a permanent
dangerous and defective condition, for which Granite Credit Union is responsible." Kemp
Affidavit, para. 17.
"In conclusion, the civil-site development appears to be "cookie cutter" in nature
with the building's perimeter sidewalk matching the finish floor elevation of the building,
without regard to other site restraints. The surrounding parking lot and sidewalk
infrastructure appears to have been designed and constructed to primarily address surface
drainage. Pedestrian safety appears to have been almost an afterthought of the
design/construction process". Kemp Affidavit, para. 15.
25. "The asphalt pavement, curb and sidewalk features encountered by Ms.
Spafford as she made her way to the credit union building were not in violation of
building code requirements, nor were the (sic) dangerous or defective".
Plaintiffs' Response:
"Three additional sidewalk trip hazards were also noted at the time of my initial
inspection, as approximately 3A inches high. The APWA (Reference Drawing 291 of
AWPA Manual of Standard Plans) defines sidewalks with a vertical or horizontal
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displacement of Vi inch or more as defective, requiring replacement. These trip
hazards are likely related to settlement, and had not been addressed or corrected at the
time of my follow-up inspection approximately one year later, and Granite Credit
Union is responsible for this hazardous condition by failing to maintain safe premises,
and to properly safeguard against settling, and to properly maintain the ingress and
egress to the building in a safe and prudent manner. Moreover, Granite Credit
Union failed to eliminate or mitigate dangerous and defective conditions on the
property, contributing to or causing Mrs. Spafford's injuries/' Kemp Affidavit,
para. 10.
PLAINTIFFS' HAVE SHOWN A PRIMA FACTE CASE
SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
"The elements for negligence are: (1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the causation, both actually
and proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering of damages by the plaintiff'.
Williams v Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726. In Williams, a tenant rented an apartment with a
mansard roof. As a result of this design, the outside wall of plaintiff 5 bedroom
window had an inward slope and the bedroom window, standing 22 inches off the
floor, was vertical, had an inward slope, despite the fact that it complied with Code.
One night, plaintiff, who was sleeping on her husband' side of the bed, arose from the
bed while disoriented, stumbled and fell through the window. She sustained
permanent paralysis.
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of negligent
design, the Supreme Court found that (1) an issue of fact existed as to whether the
window was defectively designed, constructed and maintained; and expressly found
that (2) defendant Melby breached a duty of reasonable care in not making the
window safe against the possibility of someone falling through it. Id at 725.

The Court went on to note that summary judgment should be granted with great
caution m negligence cases Id The Court also noted that "the care to be exercised in
any particular case depends upon the circumstances of that case and on the extent of
foreseeable danger involved and must be determined as a question of fact" Id at 727
In the present case, (1) there is a clear issue of material fact as to whether the
variable height pedestrian walkway on the east side of the credit union, and whether
the storm drainage area was inadequately designed, constructed or maintained This is
clear from the testimony of Earl Spafford, {Affidavit, para 3, 7, 9, 12, 15), Clarence
Kemp {Affidavit para 9, 10, 16, 17), and even to a lesser extent, the periodic biannual inspections conducted by Curtis Doman, CEO for Granite Credit Union Depo.
p 13, lines 11-25, p 14, linesl-12
This testimony is in direct contradiction to that given by Larry Smiltneek,
Affidavit para 8,9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18) Indeed, in the Smiltneek affidavit, he
clearly glosses over the variance in the parking asphalt variable heights, to the
concrete curb, and he wholly disregards the pedestrian danger caused by the water
inlets, and the deteriorated storm sewer There are multiple disputed issues of material
fact surrounding defective design or construction, and lack of maintenance
(2) Clearly, a duty to provide safe ingress and egress was owed to Mrs Spafford,
although the Williams Court found this to be an issue to be determined only by the
finder of fact Other Courts are in accord in concluding that "the standard of care
must be gauged by the duty imposed - a question of fact" Little v. Utah State
Division of Family Services, 667 P 2d 49, 53 (Utah 1983)
In the present case, not only did the Granite Credit Union CEO engage in biannual safety inspections, it also candidly admitted that it had had the asphalt repaired
and presumably modified well after the building's construction, (DomanDeposition,
Id) This is an issue of fact that cannot be ruled upon properly as a question of law
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(3) The issue of causation is directly in dispute by the testimony of Clarence
Kemp, (Affidavit para. 16,17) and Earl Spafford, {Affidavit para. 12). Again, this is a
material disputed fact, one of which all competing favorable inferences should be
construed in favor of the nonmoving party, i.e., Earl & Iris Spafford.
(4) The suffering of the element of damages is not before the Court, as
Defendant's Motion goes only to the issue of liability.
But there is one other element that needs to be proven in some negligent fall
cases. The element of notice, la Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176
(Utah 1975) the court observed that there are two competing classes of negligence in
fall down cases:
The first involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as
a slippery substance on the floor and usually where it is not known how
It got there. Id
In this class of cases it is universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the
defendant unless he had knowledge of the condition, or constructive knowledge
because the condition had existed long enough that he should have discovered it. This
can be argued in the present case, due to the age of the defective condition, the
periodic inspections by the CEO, and by its own attempts to repair the asphalt.
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of & permanent
nature, such as: in the structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. .. In
such circumstances, where the defendant either created the condition, or is
responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further
proof of notice is necessary.
Id, citing Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company,
357 F.2d 202 (3r<1 Cir. 1966). Accord, Long v. Smith Food King,
531 P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1973).
This second class of case is more applicable to the case before the Court, as the
negligence complained of is of % permanent nature, and the defendant is deemed to know
of the condition. Accordingly, no further proof is necessary and this element of proof has
been satisfied.
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We submit that all elements of Plaintiffs' claim of negligence have been shown
by a prima facie case, except that of duty, which cannot properly be ruled upon as a
matter of law. It is and remains a question of fact.
EXPERT TESTIMONY IS UNNECESSARY
TO PHOYE PLAINTIFFS' NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
The defendants have argued that to prove a claim of negligence, expert testimony is
required. It then goes on to cite case law concerning claims brought under a professional liability
theory against engineers, builders, and architects. Defendant is in error. This is not a professional
liability claim. It is primarily a claim of failure to remedy construction defects through negleGt
and lack of maintenance. Although in Wycalls v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 826, f. 8
(Utah App. 1989) the Court did make reference to a case in which expert testimony was not
required to prove the negligence of a surveyor. See Daniel Mann, Johnson, & Mendenhall v.
Hilton Hotels Corp. 642P.2d 1086, 1087 (Nev. 1982).
Defendants argue that expert testimony is required to establish the standard of care. This
has been clearly satisfied by the testimony of Clarence Kemp, however, defendant's argument
remains misplaced. In Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall supra., the court found:
We also disagree with appellant's contention that expert testimony is
required to prove the breach of duty. It is well settled that the standard
of care must be determined by expert testimony unless the conduct
involved is within the common knowledge of laypersons, (citations omitted).
Where as in the instant case, the service does not rise to the esoteric knowledge
or uncertainty that calls for the professional's judgment, it is not beyond the
knowledge of the jury to determine the adequacy of performance. Id, citing
Aetna Insurance Co. v. hellmuth, Obata, Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472,478
(8th Cin 1968),
In the present case, the testimony of Earl Spafford clearly is within the common
knowledge of laypersons. He states what are obvious observations about the lack of
maintenance, he gives the only eyewitness testimony of the injury, and he measures a curb using
a simple tape measure. Surely, his testimony is admissible for the simple assertions made in his
affidavit, as being within the domain of knowledge or experience of a layperson. Accord, Cable

v. State, 380 S.E.2d 714, 715 (Ga. App. 1989) (where jurors must be credited with knowing by
reason of common knowledge, expert medical testimony is not required for plaintiff to establish
a personal injury verdict); Walton v. Gallbraith, 166 N.W.2d 605,606 (MI App. 1969) (It should
be clear to men of common experience that the cause of the injuries was the accident and submit
that no expert was needed to demonstrate that fact). I urge the Court to recognize the common
knowledge of the average layperson as set forth in the Affidavit of Earl SpafFord, and submit that
his his testimony is sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact.
Moreover, the affidavit of Patricia L. LaTulippe, former counsel for plaintiffs, clearly
satisfies the good cause requirement of Rule 6(b), pending before the Court, seeking an
enlargement of time to certify plaintiffs' expert on the grounds and for the reason that both
Counsel for Plaintiff and Counsel for defendant had an oral stipulation for a flexible and open
ended timetable to comply with the scheduling order. This was not disclosed to Plaintiffs by
either Counsel until September 29, 2009. (See attached affidavit of Counsel, marked exhibit '6').
As discussed above, establishing the standard of care in a negligence case is a question of
fact that should not be ruled upon as a question of law. Williams v. Melby, Id As such, for
purposes of this Motion, expert testimony cannot make or break the case as it this is not a
question of law, but a question for the finder of fact.
In addition, the Utah Courts have repeatedly stated: "that the trial judge has the primary
responsibility for determining whether a particular witness qualifies as an expert and its ruling
will not be disturbed on appeal unless It was clearly in error " Little v. Utah State Division of
Family Services, Id. at 52. Indeed, under Utah Law, the trial judge has considerable discretion to
determine whether a particular expert is qualified and whether particular testimony would be
helpful and suitable in a particular case. Gaw v. State of Utah Dep 't of Transportation, 798 P.2d
1130, 1134 (Utah App. 1990).
In the present case, plaintiffs' expert is truly the only individual qualified to act as a true
expert witness. He has 29 years of hands on experience in infrastructure and building related
issues, and has authored multiple City Safety Ordinances in conjunction with pedestrian safety,
(see exhibit T ) . Surely his testimony would be helpful to the Court and would place the true
factual basis before the Court.
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Conversely, Defendant's expert is a mechanical engineer. Not a civil or structural
engineer. He has no experience in construction, let alone drafting municipal safety ordinances.
His expertise is in equipment malfunctions or in auto accident investigation. To bar Clarence
Kemp from testifying, while relying upon the conclusory and misguided statements of Larry
Smiltneek would be a travesty ofjustice. One that would prejudice the plaintiffs and would then
lend itself to misleading the court.
I urge the Court to recognize the testimony of Earl Spafford, as speaking within the
knowledge and experience of a layperson, and to further allow the testimony of Expert Witness
Clarence Kemp.
CONCLUSION
It is undisputed that on a Motion for Summary Judgment, all competing inferences of
material fact should be favorably construed in favor of the non-moving party. Moreover, as
stated by the Utah Supreme Court, summary judgment should only be granted in a negligence
case with great caution. Particularly when the standard of care element is deemed a question of
fact, and should not be ruled upon as a matter of law.
Finally, it is just and proper for Earl Spafford to testify as to subject matter that is within
the common experience and knowledge of a layperson, and his affidavit should be admissible.
Expert testimony is not required. And in light of the Affidavit of former counsel, excusable
neglect has been demonstrated, and Clarence Kemp should be certified as an Expert Witness. His
testimony would be particularly helpful to the court under the present circumstances.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is without merit
and should be denied in its entirety.
DATED this 12th day of October, 2009
Earl S. Spafford, fn Propria Persona

Iris M. Spafford, In Propria Persona
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E x h i b i t - 1 , and do you recognize t h i s document?
A.

I do.

Q.

And we've just looked at it and I think

you've identified the signature earlier on page 21.
A.

Yes.

Q.

So I just want to ask you some questions

about the document.

And I'd like you to look at

Interrogatory No. 3 and —

did you find that, the

response?
A.

Okay.

Q.

The question has asked you to identify who

had responsibility for the inspection, maintenance, and
repair of the parking lot.
objections.

And there's some

And first of all, I want to get your

definition or understanding of what inspection,
maintenance, and/or repair of the parking lot would
mean.
MR. MONCUR:

I'm going to object as compound.

Maybe you could take them one step at a point in time.
MS. LaTULIPPE:
Q.

That's fine.

Thank you.

So what would be your understanding of an

inspection?
A.

Looking at the property.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Upkeep of the property.

And maintenance?
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Q.

And r e p a i r ?

A.

Would be repairs to —

or to correct damages

or deficiencies.
Q.

Okay.

So using that definition that you've

just provided me with, I want you to tell me who is
responsible for inspecting the parking lot.
A.

We haven't clearly defined that, but

certainly as CEO when I would visit branches I would
typically do a site visit and walk through.
Our branch managers, as part of their regular
duties, would look for anything that would seem to need
attention.
And although itfs probably not formalized,
certainly any employee of the credit union that was
aware of something, we would want and encourage them to
bring it to the attention of the branch manager or
management so that they could be corrected.
Q.

Okay.

So how often would the inspecting be

A.

Oh, I would typically visit a branch at least

done?

two times a year and probably more frequent visits, but
at least twice a year I would make a fairly detailed
site visit.
Q.

And would you keep any records regarding your

detailed site visit?
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A.

I typically would not.

Q.

So what do you —

walk me through a detailed

site visit.
A.

I donft know if a detailed site visit is a

good word, but in a visit to a branch when I go out
I'll typically walk around the property, walk around
the inside of the branch.

If there's things I note

that need to be done, I'll refer them to the
appropriate people and let them correct them.
Q.

And when you're walking around the outside of

the branch on the property, what are you looking for?
A.

Just anything that looks like it could use

repair.
Q.

Okay.

Are there —

can you give me some

examples of repairs that you've had done based upon a
site visit?
A.

A fence replaced, trees replaced.
MR. MONCUR:

I'm going to object to the

extent this is vague as to which branch.
Q.

And we can make this specific to the Midvale

branch.
A.

Okay.

Q.

So anything in particular that you've brought

to the attention of —
of you.

well, it would be the attention

Anything that you've —

any work that you've
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the property, we did not get a third-party opinion
on —

on things.

I do remember making some

modification to some doors to allow for more easy
for easier handicapped access.

—

The timing of that, I

don't recall.
Q.

Do you recall any other modifications that

were made to the property?
A.

Not that I recall.

Q.

We talked about records regarding

inspections, maintenance, and I think you testified
that there were not any records other than it may be
reflected in the quarterly manager's report on the
premise.
A.

The internal audit report would have a check

mark that says the manager has looked at that and which
may or may not have comments.
found it in good repair.

Typically not, if they

But I think that question

started after 2005, that's my recollection.
Q.

And in response to that question, the written

question, the response is that Granite Credit Union's
in the process of locating documents relating to the
repairs performed on the parking lot and will produce
those.

Do you have those —

do you know what the

status is of that?
A.

I don't know and —

don't know what we've
33
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done t o f i n d a d d i t i o n a l r e p a i r s .

I ' m n o t aware of any

r e p a i r s e x c e p t a s p h a l t r e p l a c e m e n t k i n d of
Q.

And i s t h e r e someone w h o ' s i n c h a r g e of

f i n d i n g t h o s e documents t o s u p p l e m e n t t h e
A.

I'll

production?

f o l l o w — I can f o l l o w - u p on t h a t and

f i n d o u t what w e ' v e g o t ,
Q.

things.

Okay.

if

anything.

That would be g r e a t .

THE WITNESS:

W i l l you make a n o t e of t h a t

as

well?
MR. MONCUR:

Q.

Yeah.

The next question talks about modifications

or changes to the parking lot and the sidewalk.

And

Granite Credit Union's objected based upon the terms
"modifications," "changes," and the same inspection,
maintenance, and repair.

I'm just wondering, could you

define for me what your understanding of modification
is?
A.

Changes to the —

substantive changes to the

arrangement of the parking lot or construction.
Q.

And based upon that understanding, have there

been any modifications to the parking lot at the
Midvale property?
A.

None that I'm aware of.

Q.

And no modifications or changes to the

sidewalk?
34
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Anthony C. Kaye (#8611)
Matthew L. Moncur (#9894)
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL. LLP

One Utah Center, Suite 600
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2221
Telephone: (801)531-3000
Facsimile: (801)531-3001
Attorneys for Defendant Granite Credit Union

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IRIS M. SPAFFORD AND EARL S.
SPAFFORD,
Plaintiffs,

GRANITE CREDIT UNION'S
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST
SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

vs.
GRANITE CREDIT UNION,
Defendant.

Case No. 070911059
Honorable Tyrone Medley

Pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant, Granite
Credit Union (the "Credit Union" or "Defendant")), responds to Plaintiffs' First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Defendant (the ''Requests"), as
follows:

A JT EXHIBIT.
Deponenj /SUJ
DMWEST #6693693 v1

RESPONSE:

The Credit Union incorporates by reference the general objections and

objects to Interrogatory No. 2 on the grounds that it seeks information that it seeks information
that is irrelevant and unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to and
without waiving these objections, the Credit Union states that it has owned the premises
continuously since prior to January 1, 1990.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Identify each person having responsibility for

inspection, maintenance, and/or repair of the parking lot, describe in detail each such person's
responsibilities and identify by date, present location and custodian of each document relating to
such responsibility.
RESPONSE:

The Credit Union incorporates by reference the general objections.

Subject to and without waiving these objections, the Credit Union states that Credit Union
management is responsible for periodically inspecting the parking lot and that maintenance
and/or repair of the parking lot are performed on an as-needed basis. The Credit Union further
states that it is in the process of locating documents relating to repairs performed on the parking
lot and will produce any documents that it locates pursuant lo Utah R. Civ. P. 33(d).
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

If Defendant contends that another entity, person, etc.

has responsibility of the parking lot and sidewalk at issue in this Complaint, describe in detail all
verbal or other understandings, agreements or arrangements Defendant has with any other such
entity, person, etc.
RESPONSE:

The Credit Union incorporates by reference the general objections. The

Credit Union further objects to Interrogatory No. 4 on the grounds that it seeks information that

DMWEST #6693693 v1
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Patricia L. LaTulippe (#5746)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
5217 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 327-8200
Facsimile: (801) 327-8222
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

IRIS M. SPAFFORD AND EARL S.
SPAFFORD

AFFIDAVIT OF PATRICIA L.
LaTULIPPE

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 070911059

vs.

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

GRANITE DISTRICT CREDIT
UNION,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

PATRICIA L. LaTULIPPE, being first duly sworn and under oath deposes and
states as follows:
1. I am over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth
herein.
2. I am licensed to practice in the State of Utah and have specialized in the area
of personal injury since 1994.
3. Nielsen & Senior represented Iris and Earl Spafford in regards to a slip and
fall accident that occurred on April 4, 2005, at the Granite Credit Union.

4. During the course of the discovery period, I worked with opposing counsel to
continue the scheduling order on several occasions.
5. Counsel and I struggled with obtaining copies of all the documents pertinent
to this case and scheduling depositions of the various witnesses.
6. Our firm withdrew from representing Ins and Earl Spafford on May 4, 2009.
7. At the time of Nielsen & Senior's withdrawal from the case, it was my
understanding that opposing counsel and I had agreed to an open ended, flexible deadline
schedule.
8. Several depositions were taken in the spring regarding this case and at that
time we both realized we needed additional information and time. Opposing counsel had
difficulty getting medical records and when they were provided they were voluminous
totaling over a thousand pages.
9. At a Granite Credit Union deposition of the President or Vice President of the
company, it became apparent that we had not deposed the correct witnesses to obtain the
information we needed.
10. We had relied upon Granit Credit Union to identify the employees that
would be knowledge about Ms. Spafford's fall and subsequent company follow up,
policies and procedures.
11. Counsel and I discussed needing additional time to get the correct people
deposed and being flexible on the deadlines.
12. It was my understanding that we would work on continued deadlines once
we had a sense of how much longer the fact witnesses were going to take.

M

DATED this ygfffiay of September 2009.

Patricia

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J/^Jday

of September 2009

fi^rO i . Y. ]^xy\

OTA
NOTARY
PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake Co'unty

HEIDI F.McEWEN
S

I

5 ^ C t t y ; Utah 84111

My CommlMion Expires
May 25,2010

—. — «» State of Utah

I
I
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Earl S. Spafford
Iris M. Spafford
6026 Village III Road
Murray City, UT 84121
Telephone: (801) 699-8474

G<K!0V-3 PM U= U
- ••
.-.ClALOiSiniC'
"
v_i"LAKE COUNTY

November 3, 2009

Honorable Tyrone Medley
Judge, Third District Court
Matheson Court House
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Re: Spafford vs Granite Credit Union070911059
Civil No.
Dear Judge Medley:
I received in this mornings mail the enclosed Affidavit from our former Attorney.
While this Affidavit was not requested by Plaintiffs, it occurred to me that it was most helpful in
clarifying further the Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge Time To Certify Our Expert and our
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike our Affidavit of our Expert Witness.
These matters will be submitted without delay, and it is our desire to have all of these
related motions to be set, along with other pending motions, on the 24th day as November, 2009,
as previously set by the court.
Thank you for your many courtesies.
Very truly yours,

Earl S. Spafford
Iris M. Spafford

cc: Matt M o n c u r

Patiicia L. LaTulippc (#5146)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
5217 South State Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 327-8200
Facsimile: (801) 327-8222
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

IRIS M. SPAFFORD AND EARL S.
SPAFFORD
Plaintiffs,

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
PATRICIA L. LaTULIPPE
Case No. 070911059

vs.

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

GRANITE DISTRICT CREDIT
UNION,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:ss
)

PATRICIA L. LaTULIPPE, being first duly sworn and under oath deposes and
states as follows:
1. I am over the age of 18 and have personal knowledge of the facts set forth
herein.
2. I am licensed to practice in the State of Utah and have specialized in the area
of personal injury since 1994 and worked on the Plaintiffs' case until our law firm
withdrew as counsel.

3. On April 14, 2009, pursuant to Rule 30(b) and the designation made by
Defendant Granite Credit Union, the deposition of the President of Granite Credit
Union was taken at the law offices of Nielsen & Senior.
4. It was apparent from the President's answers in his deposition that many of
the documents requested in discovery had not been produced by the Defendant and that
the President, designated as a person with the requisite knowledge regarding the
Defendant to testify, knew very little of the facts, the subsequent investigation by the
Credit Union of Ms. Spafford's fall and other relevant information.
5. In fact, it appeared from the deposition that the President had not prepared
for his deposition, was unaware of the particular documents requested through
discovery, where the documents had been stored during the pendency of this matter,
what his secretary had done to prepare responses to the request for documents and if the
documents had been produced.
6. I learned at the President's deposition that he was going through a serious
personal matter and do not fault the President for his lack of involvement in the
litigation or preparation for his deposition.
7. However, Plaintiffs had to rely on the Defendants to name the best Rule
30(b)(6) witness to testify and the President was a poor designation.
8. As a result, Mr. Moncur and I discussed that it was obvious the Plaintiffs
would have to depose other witnesses and that before the depositions could take place
Plaintiffs would need to receive additional documents from Defendants.
9. Both Mr. Moncur and I agreed that at least two additional witnesses would
need to be deposed.

10.

I spoke with counsel, Matthew Moncur, after the deposition about getting

the additional documents and deposing the additional witnesses.
11. It was at this time Mr. Moncur and I reached an agreement to be flexible in
anticipation of the additional discovery needed in this case.
12. During the course of our working together on this case, Mr. Moncur and I
had had no problems extending the deadlines as needed.
13. We had filed stipulated written extensions prior to our agreement in April
2009.
14. During our discussions at the deposition, Mr. Moncur did not state or give
any indication that a written agreement was necessary between us.
15. At the time I withdrew from the case, we were still in the fact discovery
stage of the case and had several matters that needed further follow-up.
16. At the time I withdrew from the case, I communicated with the Spaffords
that there were no pressing deadlines, that Mr. Moncur and I had discussed and knew
we needed to complete additional fact discovery, that we had agreed to work through
the discovery issues that came to light at the April 14, 2009 deposition and that there
was a flexible agreement in place.
17. Because Nielsen & Senior withdrew from the case, I believe that the
Spaffords have tried to minimize any additional time for our law firm.
18. I did not learn about the problems the parties were having with the
deadlines until shortly before I filed my first affidavit.
19. My testimony is not a manufactured last minute effort to assist the
Plaintiffs in their claims.

20.

Rather it is my understanding, and personal knowledge of the status of the

Plaintiffs' case and the pending deadlines at the time the law firm of Nielsen & Senior
withdrew.
DATED this 30th day of October 2009.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30,h day of October 2009.

NOTARY PUBLIC
I
^
Residing in Salt Lake County
Notary Public

"

HEIDI F.McEWEN

I

38 South StetsSto§«t, Suite 2400.
I
Silt Lake City, Utah 84111
My Commission Expires
•
May 25.2010
I
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Earl S. Spafford
Attorney Pro Se
6026 Village ffl Road
Murray, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 278-5909
Cellular: (801) 699-8474
Iris M. Spafford
Attorney Pro Se
6026 Village HI Road
Murray, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 278-5909

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IRIS M. SPAFFORD, and
EARL S. SPAFFORD
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTION TO
MOTION TO SUBMIT
vs.

GRANITE CREDIT UNION,
A Utah Corporation,

Case No. 070911059
Judge Tyrone Medley

Defendant.

COMES NOW the plaintiffs to file its opposition to Defendant's Motion to Submit
various and sundry motions, dated January 22, 2010, on the grounds and for the reason that the
matter has been reduced tofinaljudgment, the motions that defendant seeks to submit for

1

decision are moot, and any further filing of pleadings constitutes an abuse of process by the
defendants.
It is unfortunate, but not surprising, that Counsel for Granite continues to waste the
court's precious time, in derogation of the public policy in favor of judicial economy, in order to
gain some sort of procedural or psychological advantage through gamesmanship. This is
evidenced, for example, by its most recent opposition filing to plaintiffs' motion to strike
defendant's opposition to motion to recuse or disqualify, and magnified by its January 22, 2010
Motion to Submit.
In defendant's own opposition filing, dated January 5, 2010, referenced above, woefully
untimely at best, counsel for Granite candidly acknowledges, in a footnote, their belief that the
present pending motion to strike is likely moot. This is particularly evident when the Trial Judge
denied the motion on December 17, 2009, and the Presiding Judge entered a written opinion on
December, 21,2009 thereby clearly rendering the related motions moot. And the final judgment
was entered on December 30, 2009; yet, counsel for Granite made the election to further abuse
process by filing an opposition on January 5, 2009, well after the fact, and now seeks to submit
this and other moot or untimely motions for decision.
In truth, this is nothing but a transparent effort to interject additional personal attacks
upon the plaintiffs, Earl Spafford and Iris Spafford, into the record, and to further buttress
counsels' position as self appointed policemen and advocate for the trial court, during a short
hiatus, when the court lacked jurisdiction to rule upon anything except the legal sufficiency of
the affidavit of prejudice.
Surely the able and learned trial judge and presiding judge are capable of reviewing the
pleadings and the record, as their sole jurisdictional obligation under Rule 63(b), without the
need for counsel for defendant to act as self appointed policeman or worse, advocate for the trial
court, again, acting in a capacity almost akin to Defendant entering a general appearance for the
trial court.
Apparently, realizing that this issue would likely be addressed by the Court of Appeals,
Counsel for Granite found it incumbent to further attempt to damage plaintiffs' claims and legal
2

entry of thefinaljudgment, final as to all of the claims and all of the parties, defendant's most
recent filings rise to the level of an abuse of process.
Moreover, by the very filing of its January 5, 2010 opposition, defendant has further
compounded the appearance of prejudice, bias and lack of lack of impartiality, by taking an
advocacy role on behalf of the trial court. At the very least, this gives rise to the appearance of
impropriety.
This lends itself to counsel for defendants entering almost a general appearance for the
trial court which, when taken to the next logical level, enlarges what may very well rise to the
level of real prejudice against plaintiffs and defendant, now acting as the court's agent, and
effectively circumvents the prohibition against the trial judge's ability, upon denial of the
motion, to comment upon the motion before referring the matter to the presiding judge. Accord,
Anderson v. Anderson, 368 P.2d 264, 265, f. 1 (Utah 1962). Anything less clearly circumvents
this prohibition.
Moreover, almost contemporaneous with the filing of this objection, plaintiffs have filed
a Notice of Appeal, thereby divesting the trial court of further jurisdiction in this matter. Counsel
for defendant Granite have acted improperly, and plaintiffs verily believe that such action
warrants comment, direction and guidance from the appellate courts.
DATED this IS

day of January, 2009.

/&
Earl S. Spafford, Attorney Pro Se

&
Iris M. Spafford, Attorney Pro Se

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed first class mail, postage
prepaid, to Counsel as follows: Anthony C. Kaye and Matthew L. Moncur, 201 South Main
Street, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, on this 25* day of January, 2010.
/S/_
Earl S. Spafford
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CARMEN MOREL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAIMLER-CHRYSLER CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 05-2162 (FAB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59494

June 15, 2009, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: Morel v. Daimler-Chrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9743 (1st
Cir. P.R., 2009)
CORE TERMS: disclosure, expert witnesses, substitution, harmless, discovery, substantially
justified, requesting, untimely, expert testimony, prejudiced, deadline, prepare, notice, discovery
violations, subject matter, preparation, deposition, mitigate, illness, deposition testimony,
opposing party, harmlessness, prejudicial, scheduling, materially, surprised, waited, sick,
interlocutory appeal, trial date

COUNSEL: [*1] For Carmen Morel, Plaintiff: David C. Indiano-Vicic, Seth Erbe, LEAD
ATTORNEYS, Indiano & Williams, PSC, San Juan, PR.
For Jose Roman, Jean Carlos Roman, Fernando Roman-Concepcion, Plaintiffs: David C. IndianoVicic, LEAD ATTORNEY, Seth Erbe, Indiano & Williams, PSC, San Juan, PR.
For Daimler-Chrysler Corporation, Defendant: Antonio Gnocchi-Franco, LEAD ATTORNEY,
Gnocchi-Franco Law Office, San Juan, PR.
For DaimlerChrysler AG, Defendant: Diego A. Ramos, LEAD ATTORNEY, Roberto A. CamaraFuertes, Fiddler, Gonzalez & Rodriguez, San Juan, PR; PHV Bertrand LeBlanc, LEAD ATTORNEY,
Carroll, Burdick and McDonough LLP, San Francisco, CA; PHV Robert M. Hanlon, Sr., LEAD
ATTORNEY, Hanlon Bogliolit Hanlon PC, Edison, NJ; PHV Robert M. Hanlon, Jr., Hanlon, Boglioni &
Hanlon PC, Township of Edison, N l ,
JUDGES: FRANCISCO A. BESOSA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
O P I N I O N BY: FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
OPINION

O P I N I O N AND ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge
On April 27, 2009, defendant Daimler AG • ("defendant"), formerly known as DaimlerChrysler
AG, • filed a motion requesting leave to substitute one of its previously disclosed expert
witnesses. (Docket No. 212) Plaintiffs filed an opposition on May 13, 2009, requesting that the
motion be denied unless [ * 2 ] certain conditions were placed on defendant's substitution. (Docket
No. 219) On May 22, 2009, defendant filed a response to plaintiffs' opposition. (Docket No, ???)
For the reasons discussed below, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant leave to substitute its
expert witness free of any conditions proposed by plaintiffs.
Procedural and Factual Background

j . ac,u L* u i VJ

Defendant completed prior discovery for all expert witnesses in a timely manner. The discovery
deadline was September 30, 2007. (Docket No. 100) The final exhibit list and the exchange of
demonstrative aids to be used by expert witnesses were due on December 19, 2007. (Docket No.
159) On January 10, 2008, plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the proceedings in the district court
during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal they filed from an order partially granting
summary judgement. (Docket No. 193) Defendant filed a response on January 1 1 , 2008, agreeing
with plaintiffs 1 request for a stay, and further requesting a continuance if the stay was not
granted because their "key liability defense expert[]" Charles Warner ("Dr. Warner"), Ph.D., had a
pancreatic tumor requiring surgery, and the defense needed time to retain a substitute. (Docket
[ * 3 ] No. 195, p. 1) The Court granted plaintiffs' request for a stay the same day. (Docket No.
196) Unfortunately, Dr. Warner died on November 9, 2008. (Docket No. 212) He was a
professional engineer hired to testify for defendant on a number of issues. (Id.)
On April 27, 2009, defendant filed a motion to substitute Richard Keefer, a professional engineer,
for Dr. Warner pursuant to the Courts's power to modify expert witness disclosures. I d . ; see
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B). Plaintiffs filed an opposition on May 13, 2009, requesting that the
motion be denied, or if granted, that conditions be placed on the substitution. (Docket No. 219)
On May 22, 2009, defendant filed a response to the opposition pointing to a lack of authority for
plaintiffs' conditions on the motion. (Docket No. 222) The interlocutory appeal was decided on
May 6, 2009, obviating the basis for the stay in this case. (Docket No. 224) A status and
scheduling conference is scheduled to be held on June 18, 2 0 0 9 . (Docket No. 225; see also
Docket. No. 223) Although a date has not been set for trial, the parties have advised the Court
they are occupied elsewhere during the months of at least July and August. (Docket No. 223)
Nothing [*4] else remains to be done prior to trial save a final pretrial ocnference.

Disc U I '.ion
I . Standard for Discovery Violations
Rule 26(a)(2) requires parties to disclose the identity of their expert witnesses as well as their
experts' reports in accordance with scheduling orders issued by the trial court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)
(2). Each party must supplement its disclosures "in a timely matter if the party learns that in
some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect." I d . at 26(e). For
expert witnesses, the information in the report and in depositions must be supplemented, and
any changes "must be disclosed by the time the party's pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3)
are due." I d . If a party fails to provide or supplement the information required in Rule 26(a) or 26
(e), that information will be excluded unless the failure is substantially justified or harmless.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). In addition to or in place of exclusion, the Court may order other sanctions
including payment of expenses caused by the failure to comply with the Rules. I d . ; see Radecki v.
Joura, 177 F.3d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 1999); McNerney v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 164 F.R.D
584, 587 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) [ * 5 ] ("[Prejudice . . . can be remedied by . . . allowing . . . counsel to
recover reasonable expenses and attorney's fees.").
The goal of Rule 26(a) is to promote full disclosure of the facts and prevent "trial, by ambush,"
because opposing counsel cannot adequately cross-examine without advance preparation.
Macaulay v. Anas, 321 F.3d 45, 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2003); see Johnson v. H.K. Webster, Inc., 775
F.2d 1 , 6-7 (1st Cir. 1985). Rule 37 requires exclusion unless the party facing sanctions can show
that the failure to comply was justified or harmless. Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 250
F.3d 10, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2001). Exclusion is a strong impetus to follow the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Rules") and the schedule set by the Court. See Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d
239, 245 (1st Cir. 1992).
Introducing "new expert testimony on the eve of trial" can prejudice the opposing party and
therefore will not be admitted without good cause. I d . at 247. "Rules 26(a) and 37(c)(1) seek to
prevent the unfair tactical advantage that can be gained by failing to unveil an expert in a timely
fashion . . . ." Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 358 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Thibeault, 960
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F.2d at 244). [*6] The Court has discretion to admit tardily proffered expert evidence without
sanctions upon a finding of substantial justification or harmlessness. See, e.g., id. The Court must
balance fairness to the parties with the need to manage dockets, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances, such as: the history of the litigation, the need for the challenged evidence,
any justifications, prior notice of the expert and the possibility of designation, whether the
testimony will be meaningfully different from or cover the same areas as that of the original
expert, and the ability of the opposing counsel to depose or cross-examine the new expert.
Macaulay, 321 F. 3d at 5 1 ; see Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 1, 1011 (1st Cir. 2001). A late disclosure is harmless if it "occurs long before trial and is likely subject
to correction" without materially prejudicing the opposing party- Samos Imex Corp. v. Nextel
Commc'ns, Inc., 194 F.3d 3 0 1 , 305 (1st Cir. 1999); see Ferrara & DiMercurio, 240 F.3d at 10;
Downeast Ventures, Ltd., v. Washington County, 450 F.Supp.2d 106, 112 (D.Me. 2006).
I I . Sanctions Under Rule 3 7 ( c ) ( 1 )
Kule 37 requires exclusion or lesser sanctions [*7] unless the untimely disclosure was
substantially justified or harmless. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). In this case, the late disclosure is
substantially justified because a critical expert witness died after the deadlines for discovery had
passed. The late disclosure is harmless because the plaintiffs will not be materially prejudiced.
Imposing exclusion or other sanctions for the untimely disclosure of an expert witness under
these circumstances is uncalled for.
Defendant's motion is supported by substantial justification. Death of an expert witness falls
squarely within the category of circumstances that require a late disclosure; the only question
regarding justification is whether the party waited too long to notify the Court of the need for a
new expert. Compare Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255, 272 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding failure to
receive evidence until days before trial insufficient justification for late submission when it was
the party's fault the evidence arrived so late), and LaPlace-Bayard v. Batlle, 295 F.3d 157, 162
(1st Cir. 2002) (finding insufficient justification when counsel waited to see if case would settle
before obtaining and disclosing new expert past deadline), with [*8] Ferrara & DiMercurio, 240
F.3d at 8, 10-11 (upholding substitution three months before trial when necessitated by the
previous expert's death). Although plaintiffs note that defendant waited six months after Dr.
Warner's death to file this motion, the case was stayed pending appeal. Further, no date for trial
had or has been set. I t may have taken some time to find an expert capable of filling Dr.
Warner's shoes. Defendant had no control over the unforeseeable illness and death of Dr. Warner.
He became sick after the discovery deadline. The Court does note however, that defendant knew
Dr. Warner was sick a year ago and could have tried to make some advance preparation in case
of an untimely death. The Court will give defendant the benefit of the doubt as to whether such
delay was the result of the difficulty in finding a replacement expert. Even if the Court were to
have found that the expert's death did not provide defendant with a substantial justification, it
would still find the substitution to be harmless.
The untimely disclosure is harmless because it is not materially prejudicial to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
will not be prejudiced because they had notice of the possibility of substitution, [ * 9 ] they will not
be surprised by new subject matter or a new theory of liability, and they have ample time to
formulate a response and prepare cross-examination. See Downeast Ventures, Ltd., 450
F.Supp.2d at 111 (citing Ferrara & DiMercurio, 240 F.3d at 10). The goal of discovery is to "make
a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practical extent." Thibeault, 960 F.2d at 244 (quoting United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682, 78 S. Ct. 983, 2 L Ed. 2d 1077 (1958)). Allowing
substitution furthers this goal of a fair contest for both parties because without the new expert
the defense would be punished for the death of one of its witnesses, and with the substitution the
plaintiffs still have the ability to adequately prepare.
Defendant disclosed to plaintiffs a year ago that Dr. Warner was sick and a substitute was
needed. Plaintiffs' notice of Dr. Warner's illness in January 2008, weighs against a finding that
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they will be material prejudiced. Plaintiffs should have anticipated a new expert and the possibility
of new testimony. This motion should come as no surprise. Plaintiffs' advance notice mitigates the
prejudice of a late [*10] disclosure.
Nor will plaintiffs be surprised with new material. Prejudice may arise when a party is surprised
with new theories of liability or a new subject matter after the deadlines for discovery have
passed. See Poulis-Minott, 388 F.3d at 359; Macaulay, 321 F.3d at 52; Ferrara & DiMercurio, 240
F.3d a t 10-11. Defendant has made clear that Mr. Keefer will testify on the same topics as Dr.
Warner. Defendant and plaintiffs are in agreement that no new subject matter will be addressed.
1
If after the deposition is taken plaintiffs find new material is being covered, they can file the
appropriate motions requesting exclusion as was done in Poulis-Minott v. Smith, where only
information in late reports beyond the original scope of the timely reports was excluded. 388 F.3d
at 359. As long as there is no "meaningful change in testimony," plaintiffs will not be prejudiced.
Ferrara & DiMercurio, 240 F.3d at 10.
Footnotes
1 Plaintiffs cite to unreported district court cases from Kansas and Indiana, both of which support the rule that late
substitution is not prejudicial when the new expert testifies on the same material with similar opinions as the prior expert.
See I n d . Ins. Co., v. Valmont Elec, Inc., No. TH97-009-C-T/F, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17176, 2003 WL 22244787, at * 1
(S.D. I n d . Jul. 3 1 , 2003) [*11] ; Manildra Milling Corp., v. Ogiivie Mills, Inc., No. 86-2457-5, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14159, 1991 WL 205691, a t * l (D. Kan. Sept. 23, 1991).

End Footnotes
Perhaps most important for the harmlessness analysis, plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by the
substitution because they have time to prepare for cross-examination. An ability to cure or
mitigate any prejudice resultant from submitting late expert disclosures with minimum disruption
to trial weighs in favor of harmlessness. See e.g., Johnson, 775 F.2d at 7 n.7, 8; Downeast
Ventures, Ltd., 450 F.Supp.2d at 112. The ability to mitigate the prejudice depends on how long
before trial the disclosure is made. See LaPlace-Bayard, 295 F.3d at 162 (disclosure one week
before trial too late for preparation); Thibeault, 960 F.2d at 2 4 1 , 247 (thirty-seven page
supplementary answer to interrogatory four days before trial unfairly prejudicial). In Ferrara &
DiMercurio v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., the First Circuit Court of Appeals found no prejudice when
the opposing party had notice of the substitute expert three months before trial. 240 F.3d at 10.
In this case, the date for trial has not been set, and it appears that [ * 1 2 ] the parties will not be
ready to try the case until September, 2009 due to previous commitments. (See Docket No. 223,
P 4) The parties will schedule this expert discovery with sufficient time to depose the new expert
and incorporate his testimony. Although the Court shall prioritize trying this case ahead of more
recently filed civil cases, this is not a situation where the trial date will have be to be pushed back
again, inconveniencing the parties and interfering with the Court's case management.
Additionally, the Court expects Dr. Keefer's testimony to be similar to that of Dr. Warner. As
such, the time needed for preparation should not be excessive.
Ill

C tiiiflitiiiiiis Requested by P l a i n t i f f s

The conditions on the motion sought by plaintiffs for granting defendant's request to substitute an
expert are sanctions not merited by the circumstances. Plaintiffs request that Mr. Keefer adopt
Mr. Warner's report and deposition testimony including all concessions and admissions, and that
Mr. Keefer be made available at the office of plaintiffs' counsel with defendant paying for all
expenses. These requests are all sanctions that may be applied under Rule 37 if the late
substitution is not substantially [ * 1 3 ] justified or harmless. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). Here, the
late substitution request is substantially justified and harmless, rendering sanctions unnecessary.
Even if the untimely disclosure of a new expert witness is neither justified nor harmless, however,
the Court is already sanctioning defendant by restricting Dr. Keefer's testimony to the areas
covered by Dr. Warner. See Roberts ex rel. Johnson v. Galen of Va., Inc., 325 F.3d 776, 784 (6th

Or. 2003). The conditions of plaintiff are sanctions that are not required to be imposed here.
Plaintiffs request that Mr. Keefer adopt Dr. Warner's report and deposition testimony in full, but
they cite no relevant authority to support their position. In neither case cited by plaintiffs did the
court require actual adoption of the prior expert's testimony; the scope of the new expert's
testimony was merely limited. See I n d . Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17176, 2003 WL
22244787, at * 1 ; Manildra Milling Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14159, 1991 WL 205691, at * 1 .
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has required limitations on the scope of a new expert's
testimony introduced shortly before trial to prevent new information from surprising the
opposition without requiring actual adoption of prior testimony. [*14] See Poulis-Minott, 388
F.3d at 359; Ferrara & DiMercurio, 240 F.3d at 10. Mr. Keefer should be able to proceed with his
testimony as any other expert would with the caveat that he address the same subject matter as
Dr. Warner without meaningful changes. Contrary to plaintiffs' allegations, the introduction of a
substitute expert does not ipso facto permit defendant to escape from the concessions or
admissions of Dr. Warner. As plaintiffs concede, they will be able to challenge Mr. Keefer's
testimony with the transcript of Dr. Warner's deposition. Mr. Keefer should have the opportunity
to express his opinions in his own language after reviewing the evidence and performing
whatever tests prior experts on both sides were allowed to perform.
I t is notable that plaintiffs argue for the imposition of a number of conditions on the substitution
without requesting a continuance in case they do not have time to properly prepare. "Courts have
looked with disfavor upon parties who claim surprise and prejudice but who do not ask for a
recess so they may attempt to counter the opponent's testimony." Johnson, 775 F.2d at 8. As
mentioned above, if the deposition testimony includes new subject areas, [ * 1 5 ] plaintiffs can
move to exclude it. Additional conditions on Mr. Keefer's testimony will not be required.
Plaintiffs' other request, requiring defendant to pay plaintiffs' expenses, is an unwarranted
sanction. Courts have discretion to require the violating party to pay reasonable expenses
incurred in deposing new witnesses or otherwise curing discovery violations. See Radecki, 177
F.3d at 696; McNerney, 164 F.R.D at 587. I n this case, defendant would be punished because of
the illness and death of its critical liability expert witness if required to pay attorneys fees and
other expenses. In cases awarding expenses for discovery violations, courts note they are
imposing a lesser sanction because exclusion would be "too drastic a remedy," under the
circumstances. McNerney, 164 F.R.D at 587. Even if expenses are a more mild sanction under
Rule 37(c)(1), they are still a sanction. As discussed previously, sanctions are not necessary in
this case.
Lastly, even if the Court had found sanctions were appropriate here, it would have also found the
limitation on the scope of Mr. Keefer's report and testimony to be a sanction sufficient to mitigate
any possible prejudice to plaintiffs. The 1993 [*16] advisory committee notes to Rule 37(c)(1)
lists "preventing contradictory evidence" as a possible alternative sanction. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals cited this provision when it found a limitation on the scope and content of a new
expert's testimony a sufficient sanction allowing for a "sensible compromise", "consonant with
both the text and logic of Rule 37(c)(1)," "without unfairly surprising [plaintiffs] with unexpected
new opinions." Roberts ex rel. Johnson, 325 F.3d at 784. Conveniently enough, this limitation on
contradictory evidence is already required under First Circuit precedent; it has simply not been
discussed as an alternative sanction. See Ferrara & DiMercurio, 240 F.3d at 1 0 - 1 1 . Followinq this
reasoning, no additional sanctions or limitations are necessary.
In s u m , the Court finds the untimely discovery disclosures substantially justified and harmless.
The Court reminds the parties, however, that the new expert shall labor under the limitations on
the scope and content as required by Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul Insurance Co. The
discovery violation was an isolated incident that could not have been prevented by the defendant
who had no forewarning of the illness [ * 1 7 ] of its expert. The Court shall not sanction defendant.
Cone lu« null
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant's motion for leave to substitute an
expert witness without plaintiffs requested conditions. At the upcoming scheduling conference,
the Court will set a trial date leaving adequate time for Mr. Keefer to prepare his report and be
deposed. If the deposition transcript reveals new information outside the scope of Dr. Warner's
testimony, plaintiffs can move for its exclusion accordingly.
I i I S SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, June 15, 2009.
/ s / Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Boutwell v. SW COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT, INC., Dist. Court, D. New
Mexico 2009

LAUREL BOUTWELL, Plaintiff,
v.
SW COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT, INC., d/b/a Foothills
Shopping Center, FOOTHILLS OF ALBUQUERQUE SHOPPING
CENTER ASSOCIATES, COLLIER, HAINES & ASSOCIATES, and
SUNWEST N.O.P., INC., Defendants.
NO.CIV07-1103JB/LFG.
United States District Court, D, New Mexico.
August 7, 2009.
James P. Lyte, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorney for the Plaintiff.
Bruce McDonald, Christian C. Doherty, Law Offices of Bruce S. McDonald, Albuquerque,
New Mexico, Attorneys for Defendants SW Commercial Management, Inc. and Sunwest,
N.O.P., inc.
Ben M. Allen, Jacob A. Garrison, Hatch, Allen & Shepherd, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
Attorneys for Defendants Colfier, Haines and Associates and Foothills of Albuquerque
Shopping Center Associates.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) Defendants SW Commercial Management,
inc. and Sunwest, N.O.P. inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 27,2009 (Doc.
62); (fi) Defendants SW Commercial Management, inc. and Sunwest, N.O.P. Inc.'s Motion
to Strike Affidavit and Report of Walla Engineering, and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff
Laurel Boutwell, Attached in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed May 11, 2009 (Doc. 72)("Mofion to Strike™); and (in) Defendants*
Motion to Reconsider this Court's Anticipated Rulings with Respect to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Motion to Strike and First Motion in Limine, Based Upon Plaintiff's
Counsel's Inaccurate Representation to the Court Requesting the Status of Michael Walla,
filed June 12,2009 (Doc. 85)("Mofion to Reconsider"). The Court held hearings on June 11,
2009, and July 15, 2009. The primary Issues are: (i) whether the undisputed facts show that
Defendants SW Commercial Management, Inc. and Sunwest, N.O.P., Inc. ("Defendants")
are not legally responsible for the collapse of the roof of a Big Lots store that injured Plaintiff
Laurel Boutwell; (ii) whether the Court should strike a report written by Michael Walla of
Walla Engineering, Ltd. addressing the collapse of the roof; and (iii) whether the Court should
strike Boutwell's affidavit discussing who would conduct repairs of the roof. Because the
Court concludes that the facts of this case are similar to the situations in which a plaintiff finds
an engineering report by an in-house engineer, and do not warrant striking Walla's report or
precluding Boutwell from calling Walla as a witness, the Court will not strike the report.
Because the Court does not see a direct contradiction between Boutwell's affidavit and
deposition testimony, the Court will also not strike the affidavit. With the affidavit and the
report as part of the record before the Court, there are genuine issues of material fact, and so
the Court will deny summary judgment. The Court will thus deny the Defendants' motion for
summary judgment and motion to strike. The Court will grant the Defendants' motion to
reconsider to the limited extent of taking into account the additional facts and argument that
the Defendants present, but will ultimately not change its rulings either on the motion for
summary judgment or on the motion to strike.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case is a personal-injury lawsuit involving the collapse of the roof at a Big Lots store in
Albuquerque, New Mexico where Boutwell worked. Boutwell alleges that the roof collapsed
during a rainstorm and injured her. See First Amended Complaint for Personal Injuries % 8, at
2, filed February 4, 2008 (Doc. 3)("Amended Complaint"). According to Boutwell, the
collapse was the result of flaws in the construction of the roof. See Letter from Michael Walla
to Jennifer Ashmore at 1-3 (dated August 10, 2006)(Doc. 69-3)("Walla Report"). The
Defendants maintain that Big Lots' failure to conduct ordinary maintenance of the roof caused
water to pool on the roof and eventually led to the collapse. See Exhibit 1 to Motion, Affidavit
H 3, at 1 (executed March 17, 2009)("Koontz Aff."). In addition to disputing the cause of the
collapse, the parties have differing interpretations whether the Defendants are responsible for
the upkeep of the roof. The sublease between Sunwest, as landlord, and PNS Stores, Inc.,

which operates the Big Lots store, as tenant, says that Sunwest will perform H[a]ll
maintenance and all repairs . . . necessary or appropriate to keep the structure of the store
watertight and in good order, condition, and repair," including maintenance of the "roof,
including the roof membrane, structure and supports, such that absolute watertight conditions
shall be maintained at ail times during the Lease Term," and of "[tjhe gutters, downspouts and
roof drain system." Sublease § 10.3(a), 10.3(a)(2), 10.3(a)(4), at 35 (Doc. 69-2). The
sublease also states that, after the fifth anniversary from the tenant's rent commencement
date, the tenant rather than Sunwest will "perform ordinary maintenance on the roof," but that
tenant wiH not be responsible "for the maintenance or repair of the roof structure." Id. § 10.3
(b), at 36. From the Defendants' view, the sublease makes Big Lots the party responsible for
the relevant roof care in this case. Boutwell asserts that, when roof repairs were needed or
when there were drainage issues, Big Lots contacted Sunwest, who would send out roofers
to perform any necessary work. See Affidavit of Laurel Boutwell H 3, at 1 (Doc. 69-4)
("Boutwell Aff."). The Defendants counter that Boutwell has testified, however, that she did
not know who was doing work on the roof of the store. See Deposition of Laurel Yvonne
Boutwell at 95:1-96:11 (Doc. 72-2)fBoutwell Depo")

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Defendants move for summary judgment on the sole claim against them, which is for
negligence. The Defendants contend that the collapse of the roof was the result of Big Lots'
failure to adequately maintain the roof pursuant to the sublease and thus they do not owe
Boutwell any duty that they could have breached. See Defendants SW Commercial
Management, Inc. and Sunwest, N.O.P. Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment at 4,filedMarch 27,2009 (Doc. 63)("MSJ"). To support this proposition,
the Defendants cite the expert report of Jim Koontz, which opines that the roof collapsed
because of uncleared debris clogging the roofs drainage, which caused water to pool on the
roof and ultimately triggered the collapse. See id. According to the Defendants, even if they
breached a duty to Boutwell to repair prior leaks or replace the roof, any such breach was
not the cause of the collapse. See id. at 4-5.
Boutwell counters that the Defendants' argument is at odds with their theory in an earlier
case stemming from the same incident — Foothills of Albuquerque Shopping Center
Associates vs. Sunwest N.O.P., Inc., Case No. CIV 07-0145 JC/ACT (D.N.M.). See Plaintiffs
Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 62) at 2,
filed April 27,2009 (Doc. 69)fMSJ Response"). According to Boutwell, the Defendants'
expert from that earlier case, Walla, had concluded that the roof collapse was caused by the
roofs substandard construction and deficient repairs after an earlier collapse, and Boutwell
contends the Defendants are responsible for both the construction and the repair under the
sublease. See id. at 5. In addition, Boutwell contends that the Defendants were responsible
for maintaining the roof under New Mexico law and under the sublease, and that this
obligation was never delegated to Big Lots. See id. at 5-6.
Boutwell's response prompted the Defendants to move to strike Walla's expert report and
Boutwell's affidavit. Regarding Walla, the Defendants contend that none of the parties have
designated, retained, or disclosed Walla as an expert in this case. See Motion to Strike at 24. With respect to Boutweirs affidavit, the Defendants contend that she does not address the
key issues and that her deposition testimony contradicts her assertion of personal knowledge
regarding repairs. See id. at 4-6. Contemporaneous with the motion to strike, the Defendants
filed their reply supporting their motion for summary judgment and contend that, without
Walla's report or Boutwell's affidavit, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that,
moreover, New Mexico law does not prevent the Defendants from delegating their duties
pursuant to a sublease. See Defendants SW Commercial Management, Inc. and Sunwest,
N.O.P. Inc.'s Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-4, filed
March 27,2009 (Doc. 62).
In response to the motion to strike, Boutwell contends that Walla's report was part of the
Defendants' initial disclosures. See Response to Defendants SW Commercial Management,
Inc. and Sunwest, N.O.P. Inc.'s Motion to Strike Affidavit and Report of Walla Engineering,
and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff Laurel Boutwell, Attached in Support of Plaintiffs
Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 72) at 2,filedMay 18,
2009 (Doc. 77)("Response to Motion to Strike"). Boutwell maintains that, because she stated
in the Joint Status Report that she may call any witness the Defendants identified, she has
given the required notice. See Response to Motion to Strike at 2. Additionally, Boutwell
asserts that there is no inconsistency between her affidavit and her deposition testimony. See
id. at 3.
In reply, the Defendantsfirstcontend that their identification of Walla as a prior expert witness
does not equal their disclosing their intent to call Walla as a witness. See Defendants SW
Commercial Management, Inc. and Sunwest, N.O.P. Inc.'s Reply in Support of Motion to
Strike Affidavit and Report of WaHa Engineering, and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff
Laurel Boutwell, Attached in Support of Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment at 2,filedJune 1,2009 (Doc. 78). The Defendants argue that Boutwell
was still obligated to identify and disclose WaHa as an expert. See id. at 2-4. Finally, the
Defendants maintain that, despite Boutwell's protests to the contrary, her affidavit and her
deposition materially conflict. See id. at 4.
On June 11,2009, the Court held a hearing on the motionforsummary judgment and the
motion to strike. At that hearing, Christian Doherty, counsel for the Defendants, stated that,
although he was not the attorney during the earlier litigation, his understanding of events was
that Walla was retained and his report disclosed, but was never deposed and never testified.
See Transcript of Hearing at 4:17-5:11 (taken June 11, 2009, filed June 30, 2009)(Doc. 88)
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("June Tr ")(Doherty & Court) Mr Doherty conceded that if the Defendants were allowed to
depose Walla that would mitigate some of the prejudice from Boutwell's reliance on Walla,
but maintained that they had complied with the deadlines and that another extension would
push back the trial once more See id at 10 21-11 8 (Court & Doherty) The Court asked Mr
Doherty whether Walla's investigation might be an admission or a matter for fact testimony
that Walla could give, and Mr Doherty asserted that Walla's only relevance to this case was
for his opinions See id at 11 13-12 16,14 21-15 11 Mr Doherty conceded that his motion
for summary judgment was dependent upon the motion to stnke See id at 35 15-36 1 The
Court informed the parties that it was inclined to deny the motions on the grounds that Walla's
report was likely analogous to an admission usable against the Defendants See id at 40 1841 6 (Court)
After the hearing, the Defendants filed their motion to reconsider The Defendants stated that
they had erroneously stated that Walla was retained in the earlier litigation See Motion to
Reconsider at 2 According to the Defendants Walla's report pre-dated the filing of Foothills
of Albuquerque Shopping Center Associates vs Sunwest N O P , Inc , and was never
disclosed m that case, and thus the Defendants never ratified that report in a way that would
make it an admission See Motion to Reconsider at 2
Boutwell responded that the motion to reconsider was, in effect, a surreply in disguise filed in
violation of local rules, and that Walla was retained to investigate the collapse and his
opinions were reliable testimony which the Court could admit despite not being disclosed
under rule 26 See Response to Defendants' Motion to Reconsider this Court's Anticipated
Rulings with Respect to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to Stnke and
First Motion in Limine, Based Upon Plaintiffs Counsel's Inaccurate Representation to the
Court Requesting the Status of Michael Walla at 1-2, ftted June 25,2009 (Doc 87) The
Defendants argue in reply that they were not aware that Boutwell was incorrect about Walla
having been retained earlier as a rule 26 expert and the Defendants should be allowed to
correct the factual error See Defendants SW Commercial Management Inc and Sunwest,
N O P Inc's Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion to Reconsider this Court's Anticipated
Rulings with Respect to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Motion to Strike and
First Motion in Limine, Based Upon Plaintiffs Counsel's Inaccurate Representation to the
Court Requesting the Status of Michael Walla at 1-2, filed July 9,2009 (Doc 90) Additionally,
the Defendants contend that Boutwell's response misses the point — that while Walla may
have conducted an investigation, Walla was not retained as a rule 26 expert in the earlier
case See id at 2-3
The Court then held a hearing on the motion to reconsider on July 15, 2009 Mr Doherty
stated that, from what he was able to determine, Walla may have done work on behalf of an
insurance company, but was not named by any party in the earlier case as an expert See
Transcript of Hearing at 5 3-6 17 (Doherty & Court)(taken July 15, 2009)fJuly Tr") tQ Mr
Doherty stated that he believed that Walla's report was produced in this case because it was
part of the files regarding the incident that the Defendants had and because he believed it
needed to be disclosed See id at 7 15-25 (Doherty) James P Lyle, Boutwell's attorney,
stated that his investigation turned up that Walla had produced a report for Sunwest, but was
not named as an expert by any party, though he was named as a witness by a third-party
defendant See id at 12 11-19 (Lyle) Mr Lyle contended that Walla should be treated
similarly to a treated physician and allowed to testify See id at 13 20-14 14 (Lyle & Court)
The Court informed the parties that, with the new information, it did not appear that the
Defendants could be said to have adopted Walla's report, but that Walla may have been an
agent acting in the scope of his agency See id at 16 21-17 18 (Court)

ANALYSIS
Several of the motions pending before the Court are interconnected, and the Court will
consolidate those motions in this opinion The Defendants' motions for summary judgment, to
strike, and for reconsideration all ultimately turn upon whether the Court allows Boutwell to
use Walla's report or to call him to testify Because the circumstances here are similar to
those in which a plaintiff discovers an engineering report in the defendant s files wntten by
one of the defendant's employee engineers, and do not justify precluding Boutwell from
relying on Walla, the Court will not strike Walla's report Additionally, the Court will not strike
Boutwell's affidavit With both those documents before the Court, summary judgment, as the
Defendants concede, is not appropriate

I. THE COURT WILL NOT STRIKE WALLA'S
REPORT.
Before turning to any other issues, the Court will decide whether to allow Boutwell to use
Walla's report or to call WaHa as a witness at trial This issue is the central issue underlying
the various motions before the Court in this opinion It is also an unusual issue that does not
fit neatly within the confines of any particular rule Taking guidance from several areas of law,
the Court concludes that the most appropriate course here is to allow Boutwell to rely on
Walla, but to carefuHy confine the extent of any testimony at tnal
As a starting point, the Court notes that the evidence Walla could provide and that his report
provides are relevant to the issues in this case His opinions and observations concern the
collapse that is the primary issue here The burden is on the Defendants to demonstrate why
the Court should not consider the evidence
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As the Court discussed at the second hearing, the situation is at least somewhat analogous
to the situations that rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses. That rule
makes "a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship," not hearsay. Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). While the question here is not one of hearsay as such, that evidence
rules contemplate allowing, as admissions, out-of-court statements by a party's agents
suggests that courts should generally allow such evidence. And, if the rule applies, it also
deprives the Defendants of the ability to argue that Walla's report would be hearsay, although
that is not a defense they have raised at this time.
Walla's letter is addressed to Jennifer Ashmore, who is identified in the letter as connected
with Sunwest and whom Mr. Lyle represented is a principal of Sunwest. See Walla Report at
1. Walla writes that H[i]n accordance with our agreement with Sunwest we have completed a
structural evaluation of the above referenced structure." Id. The "above referenced structure"
is the "Big Lots Retail Store Roof Failure, Albuquerque, New Mexico." Id. Based upon this
language, Walla's report appears to have been conducted at one of the Defendants' request
and to be within the scope of their agreement. Thus, from the record before the Court, rule
801(d)(2)(D) would apply.
One wrinkle in this result might be that Walla would be considered a non-testifying or
consulting expert. "Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts
known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another
party in anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as
a witness at trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). It is not dear that Walla, who was retained
before the earlier lawsuit was filed, was necessarily retained in anticipation of litigation,
although that is not unlikely. In any event, the information that Boutweil wants to use has
been disclosed. The disclosure has waived any assertion that Walla or his work would be
non-discoverable or perhaps protected by the work-product privilege. The disclosure was not
inadvertent, rather the Defendants state they thought it was a required disclosure. See July
Tr. at 7:15-25 (Doherty)(discussing why report was disclosed); Employer's Reinsurance Corp.
v. Clarendon Nat. Ins. Co., 213 F.R.D. 422, 427 (D. Kan. 2003)(declining to find automatic
waiver for inadvertent disclosures); Atari Corp v Sega of America, 161 F.R.D. 417, 420 (N.D.
Cal. 1994)(holding that voluntary discovery waived rule 26(b)(4)(B) protection), if the
Defendants had not produced the report, then Boutweli's attempt to get the report or to use
Walla might violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d
888,891 (10th Cir. 1984)(holding that trial court was justified in excluding the expert that the
defendants retained after the plaintiffs retained the expert as a consultant, but declined to call
the expert as a witness and did not reveal the substances of his opinions in discovery),^ but
Boutweil is doing nothing more than trying to use what the Defendants have handed her.
Moreover, whatever Walla's status in the earlier litigation, he is not consulting or testifying for
the Defendants in this case.^
The Defendants' chief defense, however, is the more routine defense that Boutweil did not
properly disclose Walla to them as an expert under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 26(a)(2)(A) states that "a party must disclose to the other parties the identity of any
witness it may use at trial to present" expert evidence. Furthermore, "if the witness is one
retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties
as the party's employee regularly involve giving expert testimony," then "this disclosure must
be accompanied by a written report." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Boutweil argues that she
gave sufficient notice in the Joint Status Report.
in the Joint Status Report, Boutweil identifies as a witness "[a]ny witnesses identified by the
Defendants or during discovery." Joint Status Report and Provisional Discovery Plan ^ 12, at
6, filed September 19, 2008 (Doc. 14). Walla's identity and his report were disclosed to
Boutweil during the course of discovery. As a general matter, Walla would thus fall within the
scope of this disclosure. It is not clear to the Court, however, whether the materials revealed
during discovery would satisfy all the requirements of an expert report under rule 26(a)(2)(B).
Boutweil, however, is not retaining Walla, so much as pointing out what Walla has said that
is already a part of the record. Boutweil did not ask Walla to undertake any investigation and
to offer any opinions. Instead, Walla came to his opinions earlier, at Sunwest's behest, and
Boutweil seeks to use those opinions — which are now historical facts — that have been
disclosed to her. Under this situation, the Court cannot say that Boutweil has failed to comply
with rule 26.
The situation is somewhat analogous, as Boutweil contends, to that of a treating physician.
Treating physicians are not required to issue expert reports because they are not retained
experts, even though they give expert opinions that they form earlier and that are now
historical facts. See Watson v. United States, 485 F.3d 1100,1107 (10th Cir. 2008). On the
other hand, treating physicians must limit their testimony to opinions and conclusions drawn
earlier from prior examination and treatment of their patients. See Sturgeon v. ABF Freight
Systems, Inc., No. CIV 02-1317 JB/WDS, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3-4, entered
January 14,2004 (Doc. 121)(Browning, J.). Similarly, Boutweil is not seeking to retain Walla
to investigate and offer opinions on the collapse in the manner of a traditional expert, but
rather attempting to use Walla's previously prepared report, and call Walla as a witness to
testify about what he observed and the conclusions he reached in the past, during his pre-trial
investigation. What Boutweil is seeking to accomplish is analogous to how courts handle the
testimony of treating physicians and this similarity is another reason that an expert report is
not necessary, as well as a further reason why allowing the testimony and the report are
appropriate more generally.
In sum, the Court does not see any sound reason, based on the rules of procedure or
evidence, or otherwise, to preclude Boutweil from relying on Walla's report or from calling

http://scholar.google.com/scholar case?case=61241 n«7Ri ^ o a o ^ o o ^ - D - ^ - i i , . .

Walla to testify about his observations and about the conclusions drawn from them. Like a
treating physician, however, Walla's opinion testimony will be limited to those opinions from
his earlier investigation into the collapse. The situation here is similar to a plaintiff finding an
internal report from the defendant's file written by the defendant's in-house employee, and
while the Court does not see a sound reason to exclude Walla or his report, the Court also
believes that Boutwell's adherence to rule 26 was required, and while the Joint Status
Report generally described any witnesses whom the Defendants in the upcoming discovery
might disclose, the Court believes that the Defendants may have been reasonably surprised
at Boutwell's reliance on Walla's earlier report. Walla has not been deposed, and on the
facts of this case, the Court cannot fault the Defendants for that oversight. If the Defendants
wish to depose Walla, the Court will allow it, even though discovery is now closed, and while
the Court encourages the parties to resolve this scheduling without the need for changing
deadlines, given the nearness of the trial, the Court may bok favorably on continuing the trial
if necessary to having Walla deposed before trial.

II. THE COURT WILL NOT STRIKE BOUTWELL'S
AFFIDAVIT.
The Defendants ask that the Court strike Boutwell's affidavit because it allegedly conflicts
with her testimony during her deposition. The Defendants contend that Boutwell's conflicting
testimony is an impermissible attempt to create a phantom or manufactured issue of material
fact that precludes the Court from granting summary judgment. See, e.g., Leon v. Kelly, 2008
WL 5978926 at *2, *4 (D.N.M.)(Browning, J.)(denying request to strike affidavit, because,
among other reasons, there was insufficient inconsistency between affidavit and admission).
In her affidavit, Boutwell asserts that, from her experience as an assistant manager at Big
Lots, she knew that Big Lots would contact Sunwest, the landlord, who would send
"independent roofing repair people who would perform the necessary work on the roof."
Boutwell Aff. 1 3 , at 1. At her deposition, however, Boutwell was asked about patching that
was done on the roof, and Boutwell stated that, while the workers who did the repairs were
not Big Lots employees, she did not remember the name of the company doing repairs, and
did not know who hired or paid the workers. See Boutwell Depo. at 95:17-96:11. While there
is tension between the affidavit and the deposition, the Court does not see the direct
contradiction or inconsistency that might justify striking the affidavit. The tension is more a
matter of conflicting inferences than direct inconsistency. On summary judgment, Boutwell,
as the non-moving party, is entitled to have all the reasonable favors drawn in her favor. See
Moore v. Guthrie. 438 F.3d 1036. 1039 (10th Cir. 2006). The deposition indicates that, on at
least one specific incident, Boutwell did not know who hired the workers doing repairs, but
her affidavit speaks more generally that, as a matter of course, Big Lots would contact
Sunwest, who would send out repair people. Both statements may be true. On one occasion,
Boutwell may have been unaware of who hired workers, while as a general matter, she may
know that Big Lots would call Sunwest to have roof work done. Without a more direct conflict,
the Court will not strike the affidavit.

III. THE COURT WILL DENY SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
The Defendants concede that their motion for summary judgment cannot succeed if the Court
admits Walla's report. See June Tr. at 35:15-36:1 (Doherty & Court). Walla's report
contradicts Koontz' report regarding the cause of the collapse. While Koontz asserts that the
cause of the collapse was Big Lots' failure to conduct ordinary maintenance of the roof, see
Koontz Aff. U 3, at 1, Walla asserts that the collapse was the result of flaws in the construction
of the roof, see Walla Report at 1-3. If Walla was correct, then the Defendants would bear
responsibility for the collapse. Moreover, Boutwell's affidavit creates a genuine issue of
material fact about the course of dealing under the sublease regarding which party was
responsible for particulars repairs and maintenance on the roof. See Wheeler Peak, LLC v.
L.C.1.2, Inc., 2009 WL 1329115 at *7 (D.N.M.)(Browning, J.)(stating that course of
performance may be used in interpreting the terms of a contract under New Mexico law)
(citing McNeill v. Rice Engineering and Operating. Inc. H 14. 133 N.M. 804. 808-09. 70 P.3d
794, 798-99 (Ct. App. 2003)). Given the Defendants' concession and the state of the record,
summary judgment is inappropriate.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants SW Commercial Management, Inc. and Sunwest, N.O.P.
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; Defendants SW Commercial Management,
Inc. and Sunwest, N.O.P. Inc.'s Motion to Strike Affidavit and Report of Walla Engineering,
and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Plaintiff Laurel Boutwell, Attached in Support of Plaintiffs
Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; and Defendants' Motion
to Reconsider this Court's Anticipated Rulings with Respect to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Motion to Strike and First Motion in Limine, Based Upon Plaintiffs
Counsel's Inaccurate Representation to the Court Requesting the Status of Michael Walla is
granted to the extent that the Court will take the Defendants' additional arguments into
account, but is otherwise denied.
HI The Court's citations to the transcript of the hearing refer to the court reporter's original, unedited version. Any trial
transcript may contain different page and/or line numbers.
[2] ft may be that, to form the most informed opinion on the cause of the collapse, the expert should be one that examined
the roof shortly after the collapse, which could narrow the field of potential experts to those involved in the earlier litigation.
This possibility could allow for an exception to the rule for "exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the
party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." Aaer v. Jane C Stormont Hospital
and Training School f a Nurses. 622 F.2d 496.503 (10th Cir. 1980Winternai quotation marks omitted). Because discovery is
not at issue here, the Court need not decide whether report should have been produced or whether Court could have
compelled production.
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